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Supersize Them? Large Banks, Taxpayers and 
the Subsidies that Lay Between 
By Nizan Geslevich Packin* 
Abstract: In 2013, media reports sent shockwaves across financial markets by 
estimating that the value of the combined financial advantages and subsidies for 
the six biggest U.S. banks since the start of 2009 was at least $102 billion.  Fol-
low-up reports estimated that the profits of two of America’s largest banks 
would have been negative if not for implicit and explicit government subsidies.  
The most significant implicit subsidy stems from market perception that the gov-
ernment will not allow the biggest banks to fail—that they are “too-big-to-fail” 
(TBTF)—enabling them to borrow at lower interest rates.  This article focuses 
on two main things.  First, it explores the TBTF subsidies and their unintended 
consequences.  Specifically, the article examines whether TBTF subsidies exist, 
and reviews the different estimates of the arguable subsidies.  The article de-
scribes why it is difficult to measure the subsidies given the lack of any formal 
or transparent data, and discusses the perverse effects and incentives that result 
from the subsidies.  Second, the article examines the various proposals that have 
been suggested to address the TBTF problem, and suggests a new user-fee 
framework that could be useful in addressing the issue and used together with 
other approaches. 
The article’s contributions are three-fold.  First, it provides a theoretical 
framework for understanding how government subsidies have worked in the 
past.  Second, the article applies that framework to demonstrate that the current 
body of work on the issue is incomplete because it under-theorizes the TBTF 
subsidies’ impact on the economy and politics.  Finally, the analysis in this arti-
cle usefully supplements the existing legal writing on regulation of banks. As a 
first step, the article explains the problems created by the subsidies, and sug-
gests that policymakers and market participants should be more transparent 
about the subsidies, especially since taxpayers do not have standing to challenge 
such subsidies.  As a second step, the article reviews the advantages and the 
shortcomings of the suggested solutions to the TBTF problem and suggests us-
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, rating agencies,1 regula-
tors,2 global organizations3 and academics4 made the argument that the 
largest banks continue to receive great competitive advantages,5 because the 
market continues to perceive them as likely to be saved in a future financial 
 
 1  Standard & Poor (S&P) publicized in 2011 that government repeated assistance would be a per-
manent factor in forming banks’ credit, as “banking crises will likely happen again” and the govern-
ment’s likelihood of support to systemic banks is “moderately high.” See, e.g., STANDARD & POOR’S, 
BANKS: RATING METHODOLOGY AND ASSUMPTIONS 11 (2011), available at 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/spf/upload/Ratings_EMEA/2011-11-
09_CBEvent_CriteriaFIBankRatingMethodologyAndAssumptions.pdf. 
 2  Former Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben Bernanke said new regulations aim to end the need for 
subsidies.  See Christopher Ryan, Elizabeth Warren: Too-big-to-fail Banks Get $83bn/year Subsidy. 
Why?, AM BLOG (Feb. 28, 2013, 12:41PM), http://americablog.com/2013/02/elizabeth-warren-83bn-
bank-subsidy.html. 
 3  See e.g., João Santos, Evidence from the Bond Market on Banks’ “Too-Big-to-Fail” Subsidy?, 20 
ECON. POL’Y REV. 2 (2014), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/2014/ 
1403afon1403sant.pdf (The Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s report, which was made public in 
March 26, 2014, described the advantages and benefits the biggest banks received because they are too-
big-to-fail (TBTF), and the competitive advantage those benefits have given them over smaller banks.  
The report concluded that the largest U.S. banks are perceived by investors to enjoy an implicit guaran-
tee from the government, and stated that, as a result, the largest U.S. banks enjoyed a lower cost of bor-
rowing than both smaller banks and comparably sized nonbanks.); see also Gara Afonso, João Santos & 
James Traina, Do “Too-Big-to-Fail” Banks Take On More Risk?, 20 ECON. POL’Y REV. 2 (2014), avail-
able at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/epr/2014/1403afon.pdf (a separate study, conducted by 
several Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s researchers that found that the biggest banks are more 
likely to take more risks, relying on the government to save them if needed); IMF Survey, Big Banks 
Benefit From Government Subsidies, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (March 31, 2014), available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2014/pol033114a.htm (reinforcing the New York Feder-
al Reserve’s findings); Kenichi Ueda & Beatrice Weder di Mauro, Quantifying Structural Subsidy Val-
ues for Systemically Important Fin. Ins., (IMF Working Paper WP/12/128, May 2012), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12128.pdf (calculating the subsidy at $83 billion a year 
for the 10 biggest banks, based on a discount that big banks receive, a 0.8 percentage point, which low-
ers the borrowing costs on all liabilities, including bonds and customer deposits). 
 4  “The largest financial institutions . . . are able to borrow money much more cheaply than other 
financial institutions, because their cost of credit is artificially reduced by the Too Big to Fail subsidy.” 
See Who is Too Big to Fail: Does Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act Enshrine Taxpayer-Funded Bailouts?: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 
113th Cong. 4 (2013) (written testimony of David A. Skeel, Jr.), available at 
http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-113-ba09-wstate-dskeel-20130515.pdf; see also 
Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh et al., Too-Systemic-To-Fail: What Option Markets Imply About Sector-Wide 
Government Guarantees, (Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 11-12, 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1762312 (supporting the idea that there is a TBTF subsidy). 
 5  Such competitive advantages include Title II authorizing the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC) to create a bridge institution that can be kept in place for up to five years, during which in-
stitutions get tax free status.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.L.111-
203, § 210(h)(10), 124 Stat. 1376, 1496 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5390 (2010)). This advantage is clearly 
an indication that Title II does impose costs on taxpayers. 
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crisis.6  Therefore, not only do the biggest banks enjoy the benefits of being 
large and diversified, which is legitimate, but these large and often riskiest 
banks also receive the benefits of implicit and explicit government subsi-
dies.  The most significant subsidy, an implicit one, stems from market per-
ception that the government will not allow the biggest banks to fail—that 
they are “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF)7—enabling them to borrow at lower in-
terest rates.8 Indeed, smaller banks and financial institutions pay higher in-
terest rates than TBTF institutions, because they do not have the same im-
plied government guarantee that is given to the systemically important 
financial institutions (SIFIs),9 and so lenders view them as riskier.10 And 
while initially the guarantee only covered the biggest banks, commentators 
are concerned about such institutions’ ability to pass cost advantages on to 
their subsidiaries and affiliates,11 extending the safety net, and the taxpay-
 
 6  See, e.g., Viral V. Acharya, Deniz Anginer & A. Joseph Warburton, The End of Market Disci-
pline? Investor Expectations of Implicit State Guarantees 13 (June 1, 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1961656 (arguing that big banks borrow funds at 
lower costs from private lenders, because the implicit guarantees reduce the amount of big banks’ credit 
risk in comparison to smaller banks); Anat R. Admati et al., On Collective Goods, Fallacies, Irrelevant 
Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity Is Not Expensive 1–7 (Rock 
Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 161), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2349739. 
 7  “The structure of our current financial markets . . . has not been subject to the most important 
principle of all—the opportunity for market participants to fail.” See Robert Johnson, Introduction to 
ROOSEVELT INST., MAKE MARKETS BE MARKETS 9 (Robert Johnson & Erica Payne eds., 2010), availa-
ble at http://www.makemarketsbemarkets.org/report/MakeMarketsBeMarkets.pdf; Why Should Taxpay-
ers Give Big Banks $83 Billion a Year?, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 20, 2013, 6:30PM) available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-20/why-should-taxpayers-give-big-banks-83-billion-a-year-
.html. 
 8  See e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need 
for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 800–01 (2011); Stefan Jacewitz 
& Jonathan Pogach, Deposit Rate Advantages At The Largest Banks 4 (FDIC Division of Insurance Re-
search Paper No. 2014-02, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2482352 (calculating differences in interest rates offered on various banks’ accounts be-
tween 2005–2010, the authors interpret the differences as the market perception of the banks’ riskiness 
and find that the biggest banks pay approximately 45 basis points less in risk premiums for uninsured 
deposits); Warburton et al., supra note 6. 
 9  On June 3, 2013, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) voted on a proposal to desig-
nate a group of nonbank financial institutions as systemically important. There is some debate over 
whether such institutions should want to protest against such a designation, as it serves as an implicit 
guarantee that the government will bail out such defined institutions should they get into trouble, which, 
in turn, could give them a competitive advantage.  See Danielle Douglas, Council identifies non-bank 
financial companies for additional supervision, WASH. POST, (June 3, 2013), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/council-identifies-non-bank-financial-companies-
for-additional-supervision/2013/06/03/b4754d6a-cc63-11e2-9f1a-1a7cdee20287_story.html. 
 10  See generally Nizan Geslevich Packin, The Case Against The Dodd-Frank Act’s Living Wills: 
Contingency Planning Following the Financial Crisis, 9 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 129 (2012). 
 11  In order to block any potential spread of subsidies from banks to their affiliates, it has been sug-
gested that Congress mandate a two-tiered structure of bank regulation and deposit insurance.  The first 
tier would provide many banking-related services, but would not be able to engage or affiliate with insti-




ers’ liability, to bank-related activities for which it was not intended.12 
But not everyone agrees with the TBTF subsidies theory and its esti-
mated scope.13  Certain commentators argue that the biggest banks are spe-
cial because they create benefits for businesses that would not be available 
elsewhere,14 as the banking field facilitates substantial scale economies,15 
 
tutions engaged in securities underwriting or dealing, insurance underwriting, or derivatives dealing or 
trading.  The second tier could affiliate with such “nontraditional” financial institutions engaged in capi-
tal markets operations.  However, “narrow banks” would not be allowed to make any extensions of cred-
it or other transfers of funds to their nonbank affiliates, other than lawful dividends paid to their parent 
holding companies.  See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Re-
sponse to the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem,” 89 OR. L.REV.951, 1034–52 (2011). 
 12  Bank Compliance Guide, 2009 WL 2798952 (C.C.H.). 
 13  See the policy brief prepared by the Financial Services Forum, the Financial Services 
Roundtable, The Clearing House, Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, and the Amer-
ican Bankers Association, Financial Industry Addresses Alleged Large Bank Subsidy (March 11, 2013), 
available at 
http://images.politico.com/global/2013/03/10/financial_industry_addresses_alleged_large_bank_subsidy
_11_march_13.html (hereinafter Policy Brief); Bert Ely, Revisiting An Old Debate: Do Banks Receive A 
Federal Safety Net Subsidy?, 18 No. 21 BANKING POL’Y REP. 8, 19 (Nov. 1, 1999) (arguing that “banks 
pay all costs of banking’s federal safety net, including the subsidy. . . banks can operate with higher lev-
erage ratios than their nonbank competitors because banks participate in, and pay for, a risk-spreading 
mechanism that safely permits higher leverage.”).  See also STEVE STOGIN ET AL., GOLDMAN SACHS, 
GLOBAL MARKETS INSTITUTE, MEASURING THE TBTF EFFECT ON BOND PRICING (May 2013), availa-
ble at http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/public-policy/regulatory-reform/measuring-tbtf-
doc.pdf (arguing that the six biggest U.S. banks enjoyed a certain funding advantage until the financial 
crisis, but has since reversed to a disadvantage); Mark Whitehouse, Too-Big-to-Fail Myths, Goldman 
Sachs Edition, BLOOMBERG, (May 28, 2013, 1:25AM), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2013-05-28/too-big-to-fail-myths-goldman-sachs-edition.html (arguing, inter alia, that (i) it is hard 
to understand the rates at which big banks borrow money unless creditors are assuming that taxpayers 
are responsible for part of the risk; (ii) the fact that big banks have not incurred major losses for the 
FDIC serves only to show that the government cannot allow that to happen; and (iii) measuring the re-
turn on bailouts is an absurdly narrow method of looking at the cost of financial crisis, as distress at 
large financial institutions triggers broader crises with powerful economic repercussions).  Note, howev-
er, that disagreeing responses were made to this Goldman report.  See e.g., President Richard W. Fisher, 
Correcting ‘Dodd–Frank’ to Actually End ‘Too Big to Fail,’ Statement before the Committee on Finan-
cial Services, U.S. House of Representatives (June 26, 2013), available at 
http://www.dallasfed.org/news/speeches/fisher/2013/fs130626.cfm (arguing that “[l]arge banks and their 
allies have pushed back against these points, producing a flurry of counter-claims in recent months. My 
staff and I have reviewed these arguments and have found them to be assertions lacking merit.”). 
 14  Charles W. Calomiris, Debate: Should Big Banks Be Broken Up?: The Opposition’s Opening 
Remarks, ECONOMIST (May 14, 2013), available at http://www.economist.com/debate/days/view/977 
(arguing that the largest banks’ product diversity, large scale, and global reach create unique advantages 
for their customers). 
 15  See e.g., Noninterest Expense as Percent to Assets as of 12/31/2012 by the Banks reporting to the 
FDIC, BANKBLOG (Nov. 18, 2014, 4:02 PM), http://bankblog.optirate.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/ 
06/NonIntExpToAssets2012.jpg (showing significant economies of scale with the largest Banks); David 
C. Wheelock & Paul Wilson, Do Large Banks Have Lower Costs? New Estimates of Returns to Scale 
for U.S. Banks, 44 J. OF MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 171, 171–99 (2012); see generally Joseph P. 
Hughes, et al., Are Scale Economies in Banking Elusive or Illusive? Evidence Obtained by Incorporat-
ing Capital Structure and Risk-Taking into Models of Bank Production, 25 J. OF BANKING & FIN. 2169 
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which make the TBTF banks a source of gains for society16 and justifies 
Congress’ support of such subsidies.  Put differently, megabanks argue they 
are worth protecting because they leverage revenue and cost synergies 
through economies of scale, and create benefits, which are passed on to 
their customers and investors, and lower the costs of finance for the entire 
society.17  In addition, they have been compiling an arsenal of reports and 
academic studies arguing that recent regulation has reduced their advantage 
as “systemically important” fiscal institutions. The 2014 GAO Report re-
flected this opinion, which makes the biggest banks more comfortably ar-
gue that there is no need for further regulation.18  Specifically, JPMorgan 
and Goldman Sachs have released reports that argue that any cost ad-
vantage they had during the 2008 crisis has shrunk with the passage of the 
Dodd-Frank Act.19 
But, the megabanks have a hard time arguing that they receive no spe-
cial subsidy.  Indeed, while the debate on the TBTF subsidies has been get-
ting a lot of attention in the last few years, it is  not the first time it made its 
way to the headlines.  During the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s, the concept 
of TBTF and the related subsidies already received some attention, but the 
problematic issue remained unresolved.20  And despite the actions regula-
 
(2001)(finding that bank holding companies of all sizes were operating with significant returns to scale 
and that increased risk-taking is associated with smaller-scale economies).  Generally, “economies of 
scope” refers to the lowering average cost for a firm in producing two or more products. John C. Panzar 
& Robert D. Willig, Economies of Scope, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 268, 268 (1981). 
 16  Loretta J. Mester, Scale Economies in Banking and Financial Regulatory Reform, The Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (Sept. 1, 2010), available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications 
_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=4535#_ftnref12. 
 17  Jan Schildbach, Universal Banks: Optimal For Clients And Financial Stability, DEUTSCHE 
 BANK (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/ 
PROD0000000000296976.pdf. 
 18  Alison Fitzgerald, Banks Seek to Sway Critical GAO Report, FORBES (Jan. 17, 2014 6:00AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/centerforpublicintegrity/2014/01/17/banks-seek-to-sway-critical-gao-
report/; see generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-621, HOLDING COMPANIES: 
EXPECTATIONS OF GOVERNMENT SUPPORT (2014), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-
621 (finding that the largest American banks enjoyed lower funding costs than smaller rivals during the 
2008 economic crisis but that such an advantage has declined in recent years); see also Gretchen Mor-
genson, Big Banks Still a Risk, N.Y. TIMES (August 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/03/ 
business/big-banks-still-a-risk.html?_r=0 (discussing the GAO report and stating that “its methodology 
was convoluted and its conclusions hardly definitive). The report said that while the big banks had en-
joyed a subsidy during the financial crisis that benefit “may have declined or reversed in recent years. . . 
In other words, were we to return to panic mode, the value of the implied taxpayer backing would rock-
et. The threat of high-cost taxpayer bailouts remains very much with us.” Id.  Responding to the GAO 
report, Stanford Professor Admati and Boston College Professor Kane persuasively testified in front of 
the Senate Banking Committee on why the GAO report should not be taken too seriously.  According to 
Professor Kane, “[t]he G.A.O. fell into the trap of thinking of bailout expenditures as either loans or 
insurance. That ignores the lower cost of equity that taxpayer guarantees also provide to big banks.” Id. 
 19  Id. 
 20  It is not plausible to eliminate the subsidy all together, even though the “obvious economic an-
swer is to tax this externality and cancel the subsidy. But eliminating subsidies and taxing externalities 




tors took, in 2013, media reports sent shockwaves across the global finan-
cial markets estimating that the value of the combined financial ad-
vantages21 for the six largest U.S. banks since the start of 2009 was at least 
$102 billion.22  Other studies, trying to also calculate the scope of the subsi-
dies using different methodologies, also point at massive estimates.23  
Moreover, a report that followed-up on those publications estimated that 
two of the biggest financial institutions in the U.S.—Bank of America Corp 
and Citigroup Inc.—were much more dependent on governmental back-
stops than similarly sized competitors and that their profits would have 
been negative if not for the government subsidies.24  Likewise, a 2012 study 
demonstrated that the subsidies that the largest U.S. banks received were 
roughly equivalent to those banks’ total profits over the four quarters prior 
to June 2012.25  And while the Dodd-Frank Act does attempt to put a stop 
 
means making banks less profitable, and every possible level of the industry will predictably fight any 
such program—usually with the politically potent counterargument that imposing higher costs on TBTF 
banks will reduce employment and lending.” See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-
Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1019, 1066 (2012). 
 21  Other subsidies’ estimates include (i) 360 billion in Federal Reserve subsidies; (ii) $120 billion in 
federal deposits insurance; (iii) $100 billion in government-guaranteed loans; (iv) at least $100 billion in 
monopolistic advantages in the secondary market for home mortgages; and (v) at least $100 billion in 
fees in over-the-counter (OTC) derivative markets. See Top Banking Analyst: Subsidies to Giant Banks 
Exceed $780 Billion Dollars Per YEAR, WASHINGTONS BLOG (Mar. 13, 2013), available at 
http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2013/03/top-banking-analyst-subsidies-to-giant-banks-exceed-780-
billion-year.html. 
 22  Bob Ivry, No Lehman Moments as Biggest Banks Deemed Too Big to Fail, BLOOMBERG (May 
10, 2013, 12:00AM), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-10/no-lehman-moments-
as-biggest-banks-deemed-too-big-to-fail.html. 
 23  See e.g., Dean Baker & Travis McArthur, The Value of the “Too Big to Fail” Big Bank Subsidy 
2, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH (Sept. 2009), available at http:// www.cepr.net/documents/ 
publications/too-big-to-fail-2009-09.pdf (as further described below, the authors found an implied annu-
al subsidy of $34 billion to the biggest banks with more than $100B in assets); ACHARYA et al., supra 
note. 6; Bryan Kelly, et al., Too Systemic To Fail: What Option Markets Imply About Sector Wide 
Government Guarantees (University of Chicago Booth School of Business Working Paper, No. 11-12, 
2011) (calculating that the anticipation of government intervention during a financial crash lowered the 
price of financial sector collapse insurance and resulted in a government guarantee extended to the fi-
nancial sector during the crisis that valued at over $150 billion); Zoe Tsesmelidakis & Robert C. Mer-
ton, The Value of Implicit Guarantees (Working Paper, Sept. 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2231317 (arguing that wealth transfers to investors reached $365 billion be-
tween 2007–2010). 
 24  See The Motley Fool, Bank of America Corp (BAC) and Citigroup Inc. (C): How Stable, Really?, 
INSIDER MONKEY (May 30, 2013, 9:50AM), http://www.insidermonkey.com/blog/bank-of-america-
corp-bac-and-citigroup-inc-c-how-stable-really-154274/; Robert Johnson supra note 7 at 9 (“Financial 
sector CEOs have relied on taxpayer support . . . benefitted from express taxpayer bailouts as well as 
secret “back door” deals. They continue to lead companies that seem to make profit but actually only 
thrive because of [] subsidies and taxpayer support.”). 
 25  Charles W. Murdock, The Big Banks: Background, Deregulation, Financial Innovation, And 
“Too Big To Fail,” 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 505, 505 (2012). 
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to the TBTF benefits26 by forcing SIFIs to internalize the costs and risks of 
their activities27 and prohibiting the Federal Reserve from making extraor-
dinary loans to them, it has not yet offered a real solution to end the prob-
lem.28  The Dodd-Frank Act also does not prohibit the government from 
giving financial support framed in a more general fashion.29  As a result, 
government implicit and explicit subsidies and “transfers from taxpayers to 
the[] [SIFIs’] shareholders” continue.30 
While I argue in this article that the TBTF subsidies are massive and 
do exist, whether one agrees or not, using traditional arguments about sub-
sidies in the TBTF context is not enough.  Typically, direct transfers de-
scribe some of the techniques that governments use to transfer value to pri-
vate entities, but there are various policies, which enable politicians to give 
less visible financial benefits.31  But what many types of subsidies have in 
common is that too often narrow political interests drive market interfer-
ences,32 which result in negative consequences.  And not only have politi-
cally-driven subsidies had a poor record of historical success,33 often such 
subsidies end up unintentionally hampering the accomplishment of social 
goals,34 and impeding the ability of new businesses to fairly compete in the 
 
 26  President Obama declared, “Because of this law , . . . [t]here will be no more taxpayer-funded 
bailouts. Period.” Stacy Kaper, Obama Signs Historic Regulatory Reform Bill into Law, AM. BANKER 
(July 21, 2010), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/obama-1022698-1.html. 
 27  See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Reforming Financial Regulation to Address the Too-Big-To-Fail 
Problem, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 707, 713 (2010). 
 28  See generally Examining the GAO Report on Government Support for Bank Holding Companies: 
Hearing Before S. Comm. On Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 34 (2014) (statement of 
Lawrance Evans, Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment, GAO), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg93180/pdf/CHRG-113shrg93180.pdf. 
 29  See Skeel, supra note 4. 
 30  See Bloomberg, supra note 7. 
 31  Doug Koplow, Subsidies in the US Energy Sector: Magnitude, Causes, and Options for Reform, 
Subsidies and Sustainable Development: Political Economy Aspects (OECD: Paris, France, 2007), 
available at http://www.earthtrack.net/files/uploaded_files/OECD_Reform2007.pdf. 
 32  See Joe Stephens & Carol D. Leonnig, Solyndra: Politics Infused Obama Energy Programs, 
WASH. POST, (Dec, 25, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/solyndra-politics-infused-obama-
energy-programs/2011/12/14/gIQA4HllHP_story.html (stating that political pressures undermine sound 
economic choices, and that a recent example of this is the “Obama’s green-technology program was 
infused with politics at every level.”). 
 33  See e.g., the Congressional Budget Office statements concerning the poor record of energy sub-
sidies: “Federal programs have had a long history of funding fossil-fuel technologies that, although in-
teresting technically, had little chance of commercial implementation.  As a result, much of the federal 
spending has not been productive.” CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGET OPTIONS 60 (2003) 
available at https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/entirereport_6.pdf, p. 60; U.S. GOVERNMENT 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-01-854T, FOSSIL FUEL R&D: LESSONS LEARNED IN THE CLEAN COAL 
TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM 2 (June 12, 2001). 
 34  Subsidies have “a stifling effect on innovation, as private capital chases fewer deals and compa-
nies that do not have government backing have a harder time attracting private capital.”  See Darryl 
Siry, In Role as Kingmaker, the Energy Department Stifles Innovation, WIRED, (Dec. 1, 2009, 8:30AM) 
available at http://www.wired.com/autopia/2009/12/doe-loans-stifle-innovation/. 





Focusing on the financial sector, the subsidies the largest financial in-
stitutions receive have several perverse effects.  First, the government’s 
support to the biggest banks can be viewed as an unfair competitive ad-
vantage over smaller banks that hurts the economy, resulting in many 
smaller banks’ failures, especially since 2008.36  Despite having a fairly 
cheap source of capital due to deposits insurance, small banks are still dis-
favored as they fully pay for deposits insurance, unlike the biggest banks 
that hold different types of assets and for many of which historically they 
did not pay37—the same big banks that enjoy the benefits of market percep-
tion that the government will not let them fail.  Second, it is not clear 
whether the grant of TBTF subsidies by Congress negatively impacts the 
delicate and balanced separation of powers concept, given how Congress’ 
power to provide subsidies is being used and not monitored.  Third, the data 
on TBTF subsidies is very fragmented and it is extremely difficult to calcu-
late the subsidy’s total value. Specifically, a large number of the non-cash 
political interventions are difficult to quantify because the data necessary to 
do so is deficient, particularly because many government programs are in-
volved, across different agencies, in the financial sector.  Fourth, a semi-
immunity policy, which has been nicknamed “too-big-to-jail,” de facto ex-
empts the biggest banks from criminal statutes and increases the absolute 
value of the TBTF subsidies as it translates into an additional economic ad-
vantage.38  Finally, it has been long argued in other contexts that subsidies 
change the behavior of businesses.39  Specifically, the subsidies that the 
biggest banks receive incentivize them to borrow more and to take more 
excessive risks.  The subsidies make certain actors in the market have “less 
incentive to evaluate the quality of the firm’s business model, its manage-
ment, and its risk-taking behavior.  As a result, such institutions face lim-
 
 35  Koplow, supra note 31. 
 36  Bank failures include instances where banks (i) were taken over or merged with another financial 
institution, (ii) declared insolvent or liquidated, or (iii) filed for bankruptcy. A list of failed banks, which 
mainly includes smaller banks that have failed since October 1, 2000 and have been liquidated by the 
FDIC is available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html. 
 37  Philip Swagel, Reducing the Impact of Too Big to Fail, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2012 12:01 AM), 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/29/reducing-the-impact-of-too-big-to-fail/ (discussing the 
unleveled playing field, but mentioning that “[t]hree important changes made since the financial crisis 
affect the funding costs of large banks in a way that suggests a reduced government subsidy”). 
 38  See Cornelius Hurley, GAO Must Ensure Accurate Accounting in TBTF Study, AM. BANKER 
(Sept. 24, 2013, 3:00PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/gao-must-ensure-accurate-
accounting-in-tbtf-study-1062337-1.html (arguing that this policy was essentially articulated by Attor-
ney General Eric Holder.). 
 39  Chris Edwards & Tad DeHaven, Corporate Welfare Spending vs. the Entrepreneurial Economy, 
CATO INST. (June 1, 2012) House Budget Committee, available at http://www.cato.org/publications/ 
congressional-testimony/corporate-welfare-spending-vs-entrepreneurial-economy (“[w]hen the govern-
ment starts handing out money, businesses with weak ideas get in line because the businesses with the 
good ideas can get private funding.”). 
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ited market discipline, allowing them to obtain [more and more] funding on 
better terms than the quality or riskiness of their business would merit, and 
giving them incentives to take on excessive risks.”40 
The article commences by discussing the concept of subsidies, and de-
scribes the different estimates concerning TBTF subsidies, and their argua-
ble scope. This includes outlining various TBTF subsidy studies and ex-
plaining which are more persuasive and which are not.  The article then 
continues by exploring the perverse effects, which result from granting sub-
sidies to megabanks.  The article then outlines the solutions that have been 
suggested thus far to the TBTF problem and focus on: (i) increasing capital 
and liquidity requirements for banks; (ii) shifting the focus to the creditors 
of megabanks,41 to make the creditors take losses when the banks run into 
trouble;42 (iii) setting activities43 and size restrictions;44 (iv) reducing the 
economy’s exposure, following the Dallas Fed Plan; and (v) setting aside 
reserves equal to the net advantage that the large banks get for being SI-
FIs.45  The article then suggests incorporating a user-fee mechanism, which 
could be used together with other approaches to help address the problem, 
and concludes with some comments on the potential solutions. 
 
 40  See Ben S. Bernanke, Former Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, Speech at the Independent Community Bankers of America National Convention, Orlando, Florida: 
Preserving a Central Role for Community Banking (Mar. 20, 2010), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20100320a.htm. 
 41  See Paul Melaschenko & Noel Reynolds, A template for recapitalising too-big-to-fail banks, BIS 
Q. REV., June 2013, at 25, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1306e.pdf. 
 42  The structure of a bail-in differs from contingent capital liabilities such as CoCos, which provide 
for contingent conversion to equity in the case of financial institution failure. Although a conversion 
trigger is required in both cases, CoCos are purchased by investors on the basis of possible conversion 
from debt to equity, with maximum losses equivalent to the notional security face value.  A bail-in re-
sults in mandatory conversions with the total write-down level that will be set by the level of a bank’s 
losses.  See e.g., Thomas H. Jackson & David A. Skeel, Jr., Dynamic Resolution of Large Financial In-
stitutions, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 435, 451-455 (2012); Thomas Conlona & John Cotter, Anatomy of a 
Bail-In (Mar. 26, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2294100. 
 43  This is the aim of the Volcker rule, which prohibits banks from “engaging in proprietary trading” 
or “acquir[ing] or retain[ing] any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsor[ing] a 
hedge fund or a private equity fund.” Steven L. Schwarcz, Ring-Fencing, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 69, 80 
(2013).  Similar structural bank regulation initiatives currently being considered include the Vickers 
Commission proposal in the U.K., the Liikanen Report in the EU, and draft legislation in France and 
Germany that aim to reduce scope economies and eliminate implicit TBTF subsidies, by limiting bank 
activities.  See Leonardo Gambacorta & Adrian van Rixtel, Structural Bank Regulation Initiatives: Ap-
proaches and Implications 1–3, 9 (Bank for International Settlements, Working Papers No. 412,  2013), 
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/work412.pdf. 
 44  See James R. Barth et al., Just How Big Is the Too Big to Fail Problem?, MILKEN INSTITUTE 3 
(Mar. 2012), available at https://www.milkeninstitute.org/pdf/TBTF.pdf. 
 45  See e.g., Barbara A. Rehm, An Alternative Plan to Fix TBTF: Lay Big Banks’ Subsidy Bare, AM. 
BANKER (Jul. 24, 2013, 2:14 PM), available at http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_142/an-
alternative-plan-to-fix-tbtf-lay-big-banks-subsidy-bare-1060847-1.html. 




 II. THE TBTF BANKS AND SUBSIDIES 
 A. Government Subsidies – a Quick Overview 
Neoliberalism adopts and advances the neoclassical version of eco-
nomics as a matter of scientific fact, separated from politics or ideology.46  
Neoclassical economics asserts that because of resources’ scarcity a society 
cannot have everything, and an impartial cost-benefit calculation of which 
subsidies are public rights and which are public wrongs thereby becomes a 
question of objective economics rather than politics.47  According to this 
theory, “efficient” policies are such that result in a larger overall size of the 
economic “pie,” and “redistributive” policies are such that alter the size of 
the different pie slices.48  Policymakers and scholars believe that the oppo-
sition between wealth and resources creation and wealth and resources divi-
sion formulates the fundamental framework for analysis of law and policy 
today.49 The primacy of efficiency over redistribution is the main principle 
of the neoliberal “consensus” that lies in the heart of current policymaking 
in the U.S. and many other parts of the world.50 
Relying on different elements of these theories, governments provide 
industries with subsidies, which are a method of support given without any 
pay-back obligation on the receiving end.51  Subsidies can take various 
forms and can be granted using different types of policies, which include 
direct and indirect transfers or taxes.52  Although the concept of subsidies 
can be viewed as economically inefficient, they are common in most coun-
tries.53  Politicians typically base their support for subsidies on the argu-
ment that giving subsidies can help create jobs and businesses, which would 
improve the economy and result in greater tax revenues that would help re-
pay the subsidies.54  But many have a more cynical view that calls attention 
 
 46  See e.g., Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Three Marketeeers, TIME, Feb. 15, 1999, at 39 (reporting that 
the leading U.S. policymakers insisted on focusing on free-market economic facts beyond ideology or 
partisan considerations). 
 47  See Martha T. McCluskey, Subsidized Lives and the Ideaology of Efficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER 
SOC. POL’Y & L., 115, 120 (2000). 
 48  See A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economic 7 (2nd ed. 1989). 
 49  See McCluskey, supra note 47, at 121. 
 50  See Gerald Epsten, Julie Graham & Jessica Nembhard, INTRODUCTION to Creating A New World 
Economy: Forces of Change and Plans for Action 3–4 (1993) (criticizing the new “conservative consen-
sus” regarding free market ideology); Michell Chossudovsky, The Globalization of Poverty 17 (1997) 
(summarizing the consensus regarding neoliberal policy agenda). 
 51  See WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1174 (10th ed. 1996). 
 52  See Koplow, supra note 31. 
 53  See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, International Affairs, in BUDGET OPTIONS 105, 108 (2000), availa-
ble at https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/wholereport_0.pdf; see generally Alan O. Sykes, The 
Questionable Case for Subsidies Regulation: A Comparative Perspective (Stanford Univ. School of Law 
& Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 380), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1444605. 
 54  Dale A. Oesterle, State and Local Government Subsidies For Businesses: A Siren’s Trap, 6 OHIO 
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to the fact that politicians are usually motivated by short-term incentives,55 
and that often subsidies are not required or efficient.56  This view is partly 
the result of two main factors.  First, there is very little transparency regard-
ing approved subsidies, or tax expenditures, and thus almost no public 
oversight, especially when dealing with indirect subsidies,57 despite legisla-
tures’ past attempts to improve transparency.58  Second, economists who 
focus on the political nature of subsidies,59 are doubtful if subsidies are nec-
essary,60 and argue that the answer depends on the elusive quest for a nota-
bly positive “Keynesian Multiplier”61 for every dollar invested.62  Specifi-
cally, theoretical economists by and large can be divided into two groups—
the Keynesians, who are pro-subsidies, but make their specific determina-
tions based on the specific data, and the anti-Keynesian theorists, who be-
lieve that most governmental attempts to stimulate markets via transfer 
 
ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L. J. 491, 494 (2011). 
 55  See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & RICHARD E. WAGNER, DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT 48–50, 96–98 
(1977) (arguing that subsidies are created “by politicians engaged in a continuing competition for of-
fice . . . . Political decisions in the United States are made by elected politicians, who respond to the de-
sires of voters and the ensconced bureaucracy.  There is no center of power where an enlightened few 
can effectively isolate themselves from constituency pressures”). 
 56  See e.g., Doug Koplow, Accountability and the Public Official: The Case for Pay-for- Perfor-
mance for Congress and the President, EARTH TRACK (Feb. 1996), available at 
http://earthtrack.net/accountability-elected-official (discussing how to improve the connection between 
budgetary balance and Congressional pay). 
 57  Id; Koplow, supra note 31, at 11–12 (arguing that legislative activities practices’ transparency 
has to improve). 
 58  The Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006, 31 U.S.C. § 6101 (2006), 
which passed the U.S. Senate in September of 2006, requires full public disclosure of all entities receiv-
ing government funds beginning in fiscal year 2007, and a website maintaining that data is managed by 
the Office of Management and Budget. 
 59  See e.g., Mary Clare Jalonick, Farm Subsidies Highlight the Hypocrisy of Anti-Spending Politi-
cians, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 14, 2010, 11:02 AM), available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/14/farm-subsidies-politicians-who-get-them-_n_783322.html. 
 60  Richard M. Vogel, Relocation Subsidies: Regional Growth Policy or Corporate Welfare?, 32 
REV. RADICAL POL. ECON. 437, 438 (2000)(noting that “subsidies have traditionally been viewed with 
skepticism by economists . . . .”). 
 61  See, e.g., James C.W. Ahiakpor, On the Mythology of the Keynesian Multiplier, 60 AM. J. ECON. 
SOC. 745, 745–773 (2001)(discussing the Keynesian Multiplier). Focusing on raising employment rates, 
John M. Keynes argued that government spending is a valuable tool, which should be used even if the 
government has to borrow funds in order to stimulate economic activity and create jobs. Keynes be-
lieved that such stimulus will enable individuals to have more funds to spend, which will cause aggre-
gate demand to increase, which will result in more production and hiring. Thus, government spending 
leads to a cascade effect, and the ratio of the primary government spending to the total impact is the 
“Keynesian Multiplier.” See Robert J. Barro, Government Spending is No Free Lunch, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
22, 2009, at A17, available at http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB123258618204604599. 
 62  Traditional theory holds that government spending is a success if the Keynesian Multiplier is 
over 1.0. Thus, a failure under this theory is when following a government spending the national pro-
duction increases by less than a dollar for every dollar spent. Id. (the Obama’s administration calculated 
the stimulus spending multiplier at around 1.5). 




payments do more harm than good.63  Similarly, modern empirical econo-
mists also argue against subsidies, and include Harvard’s Robert Barro, 
who said that governments do not necessarily use resources productively.64  
In recent years’ studies, modern empirical economists maintained that most 
government subsidies do not provide necessary justification for their exist-
ence.65  Moreover, certain scholars argue that it is questionable if the histor-
ic view of what is a successful subsidy based on Keynesian theory is not 
outdated.66  Indeed, when factoring in the effect of new taxes on increased 
national productivity, or the interest payments that the government needs to 
pay on funds it borrows for its spending, it is clear that the traditional 
 
 63  These economists include the Monetarists, who follow Milton Friedman and view monetary pol-
icy—controlling interest rates—as what the government’s responsibility in the market, the Neo-
classicists, who focus on the significance of individual economic decisions, and the Austrians, who fo-
cus on nongovernment dominated free markets.  See, e.g., Milton Friedman & Anna Jacobson Schwartz, 
A Monetary History of the United States 1867-1960 (1963); Bennett T. McCallum, Monetarism, in The 
Concise Encyclopedia of Economics (David R. Henderson ed., 2nd ed.), available at 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Monetarism.html (last visited June 21, 2013); E. Roy Weintraub, 
Neoclassical Economics, in The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics (David R. Henderson ed., 1st ed.) 
available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/NeoclassicalEconomics.html (last visited June 21, 
2013); Peter J. Boettke, Austrian School of Economics, in The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics 
(David R. Henderson ed., 1st ed.), available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/ 
AustrianSchoolofEconomics.html (last visited June 21, 2013). 
 64  According to Barro, the Keynesian argument “implicitly assumes that the government is better 
than the private market at marshaling idle resources to produce useful stuff.  Unemployed labor and cap-
ital can be utilized at essentially zero social cost, but the private market is somehow unable to figure any 
of this out.” Similarly, economist Dwight Lee argued that “increased real aggregate demand is the re-
sult, not the cause, of an increasingly productive and prosperous economy.” See Doug Bandow, Federal 
Spending: Killing the Economy with Government Stimulus, FORBES (Aug. 6, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/dougbandow/2012/08/06/federal-spending-killing-the-economy-with-
government-stimulus/2/. 
 65  Economists John Cogan and John Taylor reviewed The American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act of 2009, (ARRA), Pub. L. No. 111–5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009), known as the Stimulus Plan, and con-
cluded that “despite the large size of the program, the dollar volume of additional government purchases 
that it has generated has been negligible.” The Stimulus: Two Years Later Before the Comm. on Over-
sight and Gov’t Reform, Subcomm. on Regulatory Affairs, 112th Cong. 1 (2011) (statement of John B. 
Taylor), available at http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/2009-Stimulus-two-years-
later.pdf. Referring to stimulus attempts during the 1970s, they said that government stimulus programs 
“did not work then and they are not working now.” Id.  Similarly, Barro argued that recent studies show 
that most subsidies did not provide a Keynesian multiplier of 1.0, which even zealous Keynesians advo-
cates view as required. See e.g., Robert J. Barro & Charles J. Redlick, Stimulus Spending Doesn’t Work, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2009, at A24; Robert J. Barro, Voodoo Multipliers, THE ECONOMISTS’ VOICE (Feb. 
2009), 
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/files/09_02_VoodooMultipliers_EconomistsVoice.pdf.  
Similarly, a University of Chicago professor argued that “data and economic reasoning suggest that the 
effect of government spending on G.D.P. was minimal at best.”  See Casey B. Mulligan, The Minimal 
Impact of the Stimulus, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2011), available at http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2011/03/02/the-minimal-impact-of-the-stimulus/. 
 66  Dale A. Oesterle, State and Local Government Subsidies for Businesses: A Siren’s Trap, 6 OHIO 
ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L. J. 491, 497–98 (2011). 
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Keynesian multiplier is too low.67 
Despite the widely acknowledged negative aspects of subsidies many 
governments still give them to various industries,68 and some even argue 
that giving subsidies has become an imperative as markets become global-
ized and ever more competitive.  The U.S. government provides subsidies 
to many industries including oil and natural gas,69 mining,70 agriculture,71 
energy,72 postal services,73 and fishing,74 and other industries have been 
considered.75  And while subsidies for private industries by and large have 
been disliked,76 especially in the last few years, every time Congress has 
proffered a public policy interest in the government stepping in to prop up a 
certain industry, it did so.  At the same time, a number of other factors that 
in the past helped constrain spending have proved to be no longer in use, 
including Presidential Vetoes.77  Indeed, the Obama and Bush administra-
 
 67  A national production increase of one dollar produces twenty-five cents in increased federal tax 
revenue. See Revenue Statistics-Comparative Tables, OECD, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx? 
DataSetCode=REV (last visited June 24, 2013). In 2011, the federal tax revenue as a GDP percentage 
was 25.1%.  Thus, we should expect a twenty-five cent raise in tax revenue for every dollar increase in 
national production. Moreover, the government is spending now and receiving taxes from future in-
creased national production, which means that it must borrow money and pay interest.  Thus, we need a 
multiplier of at least 4.0, rather than the historic 1.0, to stay solvent. Id. at 498. 
 68  See e.g., David Malin Roodman, Paying the Piper: Subsidies, Politics, and the Environment, 
Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch Paper 133, 199, (1996) (most subsidies are obsolete, inefficient, and 
ineffective, and the case for complete reforms is thus compelling, as it will make subsidies work better 
and cut taxes); Joshua P. Fershee, Energy Subsidies, in Berkshire Encyclopedia Of Sustainability, in 3 
THE LAW AND POLITICS OF SUSTAINABILITY 158 (Klaus Bosselmann et al. eds., 2011) (all countries 
give energy subsidies to increase access to energy resources and output). 
 69  The Clean Energy Act of 2007, H.R. 6, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter the “Oil Act”] 
 70  See Laura, Beans, Report Confirms Coal Companies Receive Massive U.S. Taxpayer Subsidies 
for Mining on Public Lands, ECOWATCH (June 12, 2013, 9:42AM), available at http://ecowatch.com/ 
2013/coal-companies-receive-taxpayer-subsidies/. 
 71  See e.g., Steve Baragona, US Senate Ends One Farm Subsidy, Adds Another, VOICE OF AMERICA 
(June 10, 2013), http://www.voanews.com/content/us-senate-ends-one-farm-subsidy-adds-
another/1679207.html (discussing a $955 billion Farm Bill); see generally Matthew C. Porterfield, U.S. 
Farm Subsidies and the Expiration of the WTO’s Peace Clause, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 999 (2006) 
(discussing the U.S. Farm Subsidies). 
 72  See e.g., Joshua P. Fershee, Promoting an All of the Above Approach or Pushing (Oil) Addiction 
and Abuse?: The Curious Role of Energy Subsidies and Mandates in U.S. Energy Policy, 7 ENV. & 
ENERGY LAW & POLICY J., at 2 (2012). 
 73  Larry Clifton, U.S. Postal Service Back for Record $14 Billion Subsidy, THE EXAMINER (Nov. 
15, 2012), http://www.examiner.com/article/u-s-postal-service-back-for-record-14-billion-subsidy. 
 74  See Press Release on U.S. Direct Fishing Subsidies Equal One-fifth the Value of U.S. Catch 
(Mar., 2009), available at http://www.rocean.org/press-release/new-study-shows-eliminating-harmful-
subsidies-could-improve-health-us-fisheries ($713 million annual subsidies go to the fishing sector). 
 75  See generally Brad A. Greenberg, A Public Press? Evaluating the Viability of Government Sub-
sidies for the Newspaper Industry, 19 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 189 (2012). 
 76  See, e.g., John Tamny, Why Tax Subsidies for Plant & Equipment Are Anti-Growth, REAL CLEAR 
MARKETS (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2013/09/26/what_gm_fedex_and_ 
google_tell_us_about_100_equipment_depreciation_100626.html. 
 77  KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22188, REGULAR VETOES AND POCKET VETOES: 




tions have been inactive about using their veto power to thwart appropria-
tions bills, despite the frequency with which other Presidents did so in the 
past.78  Without the threat of actual vetoes, legislators are less concerned 
with constraining spending.  Accordingly, the number of Congressional 
earmarks grew tenfold between 1990 and 2005.79  The subsidies included 
funds to industries that have a tangible connection to the financial system, 
operations meant to expand the workforce, and efforts to promote home 
ownership. 
 B. The TBTF Subsidy 
They were careless people . . . they smashed up things 
and creatures and then retreated back into their money or 
their vast carelessness, or whatever it was that kept them 
together and let other people clean up the mess they had 
made . . . . 
— F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby 
 1. Background 
Even before the 2008 financial crisis, subsidizing financial institutions 
has been viewed as a problematic policy.  In August 1989, Congress re-
pealed the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation’s financial in-
stitutions’ tax benefit provisions80 after an unfavorable report prepared by 
the House Committee on Ways and Means81 advocated against the tax ben-
efits.  The report stated that the “subsidy provided to financially troubled 
financial institutions through more favorable tax rules than those applicable 
to other taxpayers is an inefficient way to provide assistance to such institu-
tions.”82  It endorsed the abolition of any such “indirect assistance.”83 
During the 1990’s and early 2000’s, regulators made a number of stat-
utory and regulatory changes in an attempt to lessen the impact of the gov-
 
AN OVERVIEW (2008), available at http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RS22188.pdf (“The 
U.S. Constitution (Article I, Section 7) provides that. . . President may sign a bill into law within the 10-
day period . . . or veto it.”). 
 78  See e.g., id.; Koplow, supra note 31; The American Presidency Project at UC Santa Barbara, 
Presidential Vetoes: Washington–Obama, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data/vetoes.php. 
 79  John Fund, Time for a Time-Out? Will the GOP learn its lesson on Pork?, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 18, 
2006), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122529312756180443.html. 
 80  This legislation was passed as the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act 
of 1989 (“FIRREA”), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989). 
 81  The Committee on Ways and Means is the chief tax-writing committee in the House of Repre-
sentatives.  See Committee History, COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, http://waysandmeans.house.gov/ 
about/history.htm. 
 82  H.R. Rep. No. 54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2 at 25 (1989). 
 83  H.R. Rep. No. 101-54, at 25 (1989), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1989, at 86, 356. 
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ernment safety net to banks’ operations.84 
Among the changes were the (i) Basel Accords, which established in-
ternational minimum capital measures as well as capital tier requirements to 
the risk profiles of banks; (ii) Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Im-
provement Act (FDICIA), which included provisions designed to limit reg-
ulatory forbearance by requiring more-timely and less discretionary inter-
vention;85 (iii) FDICIA’s “least-cost test,” under which, with rare 
exceptions, the FDIC may meet its insurance obligations by means other 
than a payoff only if the other method is deemed “least costly” to the depos-
it insurance funds; (iv) FDICIA requirement that the FDIC develop and im-
plement a system of risk-based deposit insurance premiums; (v) Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act, which was passed in 1993, and included a na-
tional depositor preference statute that changed the priority of claims on 
failed depository institutions so that a failed bank’s depositors, and by im-
plication the FDIC, have priority over the claims of general creditors, which 
in turn were expected to demand higher interest rates on their funds and 
more collateral to compensate for their increased risk of loss; (vi) FDICIA’s 
restrictions of the Federal Reserve’s ability to lend to undercapitalized 
banks through the discount window, or to lend to banks that fall below min-
imum capital standards, because restricting such banks’ access to the dis-
count window reduces the gross subsidy that flows from the access; and 
(vii) changes to payments system policies that reduced the subsidy arising 
from the Federal Reserve’s guarantee of transactions on the Federal Re-
serve’s large-dollar electronic payments system.  These changes included 
forming a system of credit limit on institutions’ daily payment wiring over-
drafts, and charging fees for daylight overdrafts incurred in Federal Reserve 
Banks’ accounts.  The debt limits and daylight overdraft fees led to (i) a 
dramatic decline in total daylight overdrafts and (ii) reduced the Federal 
Reserve’s intra-day credit risk and its liability as guarantor of all Fedwire 
transactions.  These two effects reduced the subsidy accruing from the gov-
ernment-operated payments system.86 
Following the 2008 financial crisis, the United States has not been 
alone in granting large subsidies to the biggest banks.87  Studies estimate 
the crisis has prompted global spending of more than $11 trillion of assis-
tance to financial institutions, and more than $6 trillion on economic stimu-
 
 84  Bank Compliance Guide, 2009 WL 2798952 (C.C.H.). 
 85  Under these Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) provisions, as an institution’s capital position de-
clines, the appropriate bank regulator is required to increase the severity of its actions. 
 86  Id. 
 87  Andrew Haldane, Speech at Institute of Economic Affairs’ 22nd Annual Series, The 2012 Bees-
ley Lectures: On Being the Right Size (Oct. 25, 2012) (arguing that by 2009, the 29 largest banks in the 
world obtained in annual subsidies more than $700 billion); Ueda et al., supra note 3 (arguing that in 
many countries financial institutions enjoyed a funding cost advantage of 60 basis points in 2007, and 
80 basis points in 2009). 




lus programs.88  The bulk of these programs were in the United States, 
United Kingdom, and other European countries.89  In the U.K., for example, 
experts calculated that in 2007-2009, an annual subsidy for the top five 
banks totaled at more than £50 billion.90  That support included direct sub-
sidies, extraordinary liquidity measures, occasional liquidity support, a de-
posit guarantee scheme,91 and implicit subsidies, which correlated with 
market expectations of government support.92  And while some of that sup-
port is scheduled to end in the near future, some form of central bank li-
quidity insurance and deposit guarantee scheme will likely remain.93 
Deciding to give subsidies to banks was part of the way several gov-
ernments attempted to deal with the 2008 crisis.  In order to maintain finan-
cial stability in the United States following the crisis, both President Bush 
and President Obama decided to rely on the Keynesian theory.  The Presi-
dents pushed for Congress to pass significant stimulus bills focused on in-
jecting large amounts of money into the economy.94  Their efforts were suc-
cessful and support was provided to financial institutions that totaled at 
approximately $1.525 trillion.  The funds were distributed through the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and the Stimulus Plan, even though 
it was difficult to isolate empirical data on the effects of government spend-
ing from other economic factors.95  And while government payments to 
bailout the biggest banks during the crisis are not the same as the forward-
looking value of any implicit and explicit subsidies, such bailout payments 
can be viewed as a measure of the extent, to which banks will continue to 
benefit from the government subsidies.  This might have been why Ameri-
cans so strongly opposed the banks’ bailout.  That strong opposition has led 
 
 88  See Ivry, supra note 22. 
 89  See Wilmarth, supra note 27, at 708. 
 90  Andrew Haldane, Comments by Mr. Andrew G. Haldane, Executive Director, Financial Stabil-
ity, Bank of England, at the Institute of Regulation & Risk, Hong Kong: The $100 Billion Question 
(Mar. 30, 2010). 
 91  This scheme is known as the Financial Services Compensation Scheme, which is mainly indus-
try-funded. See Assessing State Support to the UK Banking Sector, OXERA 2 (Mar. 2011), 
http://www.oxera.com/Oxera/media/Oxera/downloads/reports/Assessing-state-support-to-the-UK-
banking-sector.pdf?ext=.pdf (prepared for The Royal Bank of Scotland) [hereinafter “Oxera Report”]. 
 92  Id. (calculating annual £5.9 billion subsidies for a £7 trillion assets financial system and volatility 
of about 4%). 
 93  Id. 
 94  J.D. Foster, Keynesian Fiscal Stimulus Policies Stimulate Debt-Not the Economy, HERITAGE 
FOUND. (Jul. 27, 2009), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/07/keynesian-fiscal-stimulus-
policies-stimulate-debt-not-the-economy. 
 95  “If the funds committed under TARP have an intended purpose and are not merely no-strings-
attached subsidies to financial institutions . . . then it seems essential for Treasury to monitor whether 
the funds are used for those intended purposes . . . . Treasury cannot simply trust that the financial insti-
tutions will act in the desired ways; it must verify.” See M.P. Taylor & Nena Groskind, 01-05-09 CR. 
UNION REG. INSIDER 1 (discussing reports prepared by the Government Accountability Office and the 
congressional panel overseeing the program). 
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many government officials to promise to never again rescue a large failing 
bank; in fact, the Dodd-Frank Act was meant to end the TBTF problem. 
Despite attempts to resolve the megabanks’ subsidies issue, the bene-
fits given to TBTF banks are still so significant that even the former Chair-
man of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, admitted there is a problem.  
Former Chairman Bernanke conceded that it is only because of their size 
that certain banks get such subsidies.96  Similarly, rating agencies, which 
could not ignore the benefits such banks receive, have stated in reports that 
if not for an implicit government guarantee, debt sold by some of the big-
gest banks would have fallen to junk status.97  Consequently, in 2012–2013 
the attention that the TBTF problem received resulted not just in media re-
ports, but also in several suggested solutions on how to deal with the TBTF 
problem.98  Among such solutions is the Brown–Vitter 2013 bill, which us-
es the “subsidy” issue as one of its key premises, as well as the primary ra-
tionale for other regulatory actions.99  Many view this legislation, which re-
quires megabanks to borrow less, as a legitimate response to the problem.100 
In addition, the focus on the TBTF banks’ subsidies pushed the Senate 
to unanimously hold that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
would conduct a study of the subsidy allegedly enjoyed by the biggest fi-
nancial institutions.101  In response, on November 14, 2013, the GAO issued 
the first, and on July 31, 2014, the second of two highly anticipated reports 
that detail the benefits that big banks receive because they are viewed as 
TBTF.  The first report suggested that the government was dragging its feet 
on rules required by the Dodd-Frank Act, which was intended to give rem-
edy to the problem, mainly by limiting the aid the government can provide 
 
 96  See Anat R. Admati, We’re All Still Hostages to the Big Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2013, at 
A23, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/26/opinion/were-all-still-hostages-to-the-big-
banks.html?hp&_r=1&. 
 97  See chart, Rescued from Junk, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 27, 2013),  
http://www.bloomberg.com/image/iuhcmWgTWFWo.jpg. 
 98  See infra Part IV. 
 99  See Sherrod Brown, Vitter Unveil Legislation That Would End “Too Big To Fail” Policies (Apr. 
24, 2013), http://www.brown.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/brown-vitter-unveil-legislation-that-
would-end-too-big-to-fail-policies. 
 100 Shahien Nasiripour, Andy Haldane Praises Brown-Vitter Bill To End ‘Too Big To Fail’, 
HUFFINGTON POST (May 17, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/16/andy-haldane-brown-
vitter_n_3289168.html; Simon Johnson, Brown-Vitter Rearranges Financial-Reform Battlefield, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr 28, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-28/brown-vitter-rearranges-
financial-reform-battlefield.html. 
 101 Karen Shaw Petrou, To End Big-Bank Subsidies, Fix the FDIC’s ‘Off’ Switch, AM. BANKER 
(May 21, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/to-end-big-bank-subsidies-fix-
the-fdic-off-switch-1059287-1.html.  See also Letter from U.S. Senators David Vitter (R-La.) and Sher-
rod Brown (D-Ohio) to the Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller General of the United States and Director of 
the Government Accountability Office (Jan. 1, 2013), http://www.vitter.senate.gov/newsroom/press/ 
vitter-to-gao-open-books-of-too-big-to-fail-megabanks (arguing that the GAO to conduct a study of the 
economic benefits that the “too-big-to-fail” megabanks receive.). 




to the megabanks in case of an emergency.  According to the first GAO re-
port, the Dodd-Frank Act “contains provisions that aim to modify the scope 
of federal safety nets, restrict future government support and strengthen 
regulatory oversight for the banking sector, but implementation is incom-
plete and the effectiveness of some provisions remains uncertain.”  Never-
theless, according to the second GAO report, while evidence points at lower 
funding costs to bigger banks during the financial crisis, there is mixed evi-
dence of such advantages in recent years.102 
While the concept of massive subsidies to megabanks is controversial, 
there are legitimate reasons for providing at least some government support 
to megabanks.  Indeed, the main reason for government support is to protect 
the financial system from shocks that might trigger a systemic event.103  
Professor Schwarcz of Duke University defines systemic risk as “the risk 
that (i) an economic shock such as market or institutional failure triggers 
(through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a chain of markets or 
institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to financial institutions, (ii) 
resulting in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its availability, 
often evidenced by substantial financial-market price volatility.”104  In gen-
eral, it appears that the literature recognizes certain types of contagion 
channels by which shocks are transmitted through the system.105  These in-
clude the liability mechanism, which explains how by transforming short-
term liabilities into long-term assets, banks are exposed to the risk that even 
a rather small shock to the system can result in a loss of confidence and a 
run on the bank.  Such a situation makes it difficult for banks to even bor-
row money from other financial institutions.  These contagion channels also 
include the asset mechanism, which focuses on coordinated fire sales of as-
sets that result in further decreasing the prices of assets held by other 
banks.106  According to certain experts, in 2008 the liquidity shocks that the 
financial industry dealt with were so radical,107 that governments had no 
choice but to inject great amounts of cash into liquidity-strapped financial 
institutions.108 
 
 102 Id. 
 103 See the Oxera Report, supra note 91, at 3. 
 104 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 204 (2008). 
 105 See the Oxera Report, supra note 91, at 3. 
 106 For example, the risk for a “run on the bank,” which results from the depositors demanding the 
return of their funds at any given point in time, and the more demands there are the less SIFIs can ac-
commodate these requests, and if SIFIs cannot liquidate investments fast enough to obtain the money 
demanded they are in trouble.  See Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Haz-
ard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 183, 193 (2009). 
 107 See, e.g., Robin Sidel, et al., WaMu Is Seized, Sold Off to J.P. Morgan in Largest Failure in U.S. 
Banking History, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2008, at A1 (“The collapse . . . was triggered by a wave of de-
posit withdrawals . . . .”). 
 108 Nevertheless, certain studies have argued, from a conceptual perspective, that such a support 
would have been provided to protect the financial system from systemic shocks regardless of the market 
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Despite the above, and the discussed neoclassical economics’ theories 
of subsidies, it is difficult to argue that government support of megabanks, 
especially in the last few years, has been the result of a carefully structured, 
well-researched policy.  It is also difficult to argue that such subsidies re-
flect the public’s preferences concerning this issue.109  Moreover, several 
years after the Stimulus Plan was initiated, many still argue that it failed to 
produce a minimal Keynesian multiplier.110  And what made things even 
worse were recent media reports reporting on massive subsidies given to 
major U.S. banks, which sent shockwaves across the markets.111 
 2. Calculating the Subsidies 
But the media only put the TBTF issue at the center of the attention.  It 
did not create it.  Indeed, in the years following the financial crisis, several 
scholars and researchers studied the issue and argued that TBTF subsidies 
exist, and took it upon themselves to calculate the subsidies’ scope.  They 
used different methodologies to demonstrate that the most significant im-
plicit subsidy stems from market perception that the government will not 
allow the biggest banks to fail—that they are “too-big-to-fail”—enabling 
them to borrow at lower interest rates, and making them safe in investors’ 
 
structure—one with many small banks or one with a few large banks. See, e.g., Oxera Report, supra 
note 91, at 5–6. 
 109 A recent poll found strong opposition to federal bailouts of financial institutions. See PEW 
RESEARCH CTR., Possible Negatives For Candidates: Vote For Bank Bailout, Palin Support (Oct. 6, 
2010), http://www.people-press.org/2010/10/06/possible-negatives-for-candidates-vote-for-bank-
bailout-palin-support/.  In addition, the 2008 financial crisis and the financial support given to the larg-
est banks resulted in the creation of the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement.  For the origin of OWS 
see Matt Sledge, Reawakening The Radical Imagination: The Origins Of Occupy Wall Street, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 10, 2011, 2:21PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/10/occupy-wall-
street-origins_n_1083977.html.  See also Americans still angry at Wall St over Lehman, Fin24, 
REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2013), http://m.news24.com/fin24/Companies/Financial-Services/Americans-still-
angry-at-Wall-St-over-Lehman-20130915 (discussing a recent Reuters/Ipsos poll it is stated that “[a]s 
many as 44% of those polled believe the government should not have bailed out financial institu-
tions . . . . Fifty-three percent think not enough was done to prosecute bankers . . . [and] as many as 30% 
of Americans believe Wall Street banks and traders do not help the economy grow and create jobs.”).  
See also Thomas Hoeing, Stop Subsidizing Wall Street, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2013), 
http://www.occupy.com/article/stop-subsidizing-wall-street (“While trading and investment activities 
are vital parts of the financial services industry, there is no economic or social rationale for protecting 
and subsidizing them.”) 
 110 See, e.g., Id; Mulligan supra note 66; The 2009 Stimulus Package: Two Years Later: Hearing 
Before the House Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, Subcomm. on Reg. Aff., 112th Cong. 6 (2011) 
(statement of John B. Taylor) http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg67173/pdf/CHRG-
112hhrg67173.pdf.; see generally T. RANDOLPH BEARD, ET AL., Can Government Spending Get Ameri-
ca Working Again? An Empirical Investigation, 31 PHOENIX CTR. POL’Y BULL. (2011), available at 
www.Phoenix-Center.org/policybulletin/PCPB31final.pdf (finding “government spending has zero ef-
fect on private-sector job creation”). 
 111 See Ivry, supra note 23. 




and rating agencies’ eyes.112 
First, showing that parties transacting with TBTF banks agree to ac-
cept lower returns because they believe these banks will never fail, Virginia 
Tech professor Deniz Anginer calculated that this perception totaled at a 
$102 billion subsidy.  Specifically, professor Anginer calculated that the 
subsidy received by the six biggest U.S. banks is mainly the result of bond-
holders accepting lower returns, believing that these banks are safer be-
cause the government would bail them out if needed.  Professor Anginers 
calculated that between 2009–2011 the subsidy included $37.3 billion in 
2009 after TARP, $29.9 billion in 2010, and $14.6 billion in 2011.113  Then 
professor Anginer added to his calculation (i) data on publicly known tax 
breaks that the six biggest banks received, (ii) additional income from the 
Federal Reserve’s mortgage–bond purchases, and (iii) the interest the Fed-
eral Reserve paid for bank deposits, all totaling at $102 billion.114 
Second, also focusing on investors’ expectations of government sup-
port, several scholars demonstrated that the expectations were embedded in 
the credit spreads on bonds issued by major banks.115  They computed the 
credit spread on each bank’s bonds as the difference between the yield on 
its bonds and the corresponding maturity-matched Treasury bond.  The 
study showed a noticeable negative relationship between spreads and sys-
temic importance. Specifically, it showed that size—as a factor contributing 
to systemic importance—has a negative effect on spreads, and that for sys-
temically important banks, spreads are less sensitive to risk. The study as-
sessed the volume of the subsidies by (i) quantifying the value of the fund-
ing subsidy in basis points; (ii) using the basis point to calculate a dollar 
value of the banks’ benefit by multiplying the annual reduction funding 
costs by the bank’s total uninsured liabilities.  This calculation totaled at an 
annual funding cost advantage of 20 basis points from 1990–2010, valued 
at $20 billion per year, except for 2009, during which the cost advantage 
was higher than 120 basis points, and totaled over $150 billion.116 
Third, demonstrating that the biggest banks receive a discount on their 
borrowing costs, two IMF economists published in Bloomberg the results 
of a study, which received wide coverage.117  They concluded that the big-
 
 112 One of the top rating agencies, S&P, even published predictions foreseeing that the U.S. gov-
ernment assistance to the biggest banks will become a permanent factor in forming banks’ credit.  See 
S&P Report, supra note 1. 
 113 See Ivry, supra note 22. 
 114 Id. 
 115 See Warburton et al., supra note 6. 
 116 Id. at 4. 
 117 See generally Eric Zuesse, This Year’s Subsidy to Wall Street = the Amount of This Year’s Se-
quester Cuts (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2013/02/this-years-subsidy-to-wall-
street-the-amount-of-this-years-sequester-cuts.html.; Eric Zuesse, Bloomberg: US Subsidy to Wall Street 
= the Amount of Sequester Cuts; It’s $83 Billion in 2013 (10:23 am, Feb. 27 2013), http://truth-
out.org/buzzflash/commentary/bloomberg-us-subsidy-to-wall-street-the-amount-of-sequester-cuts-it-s-
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gest banks received substantial rewards because the bigger they are, the 
more disastrous their failure would be and the more certain they can be of a 
taxpayer bailout.  Accordingly, the ten U.S. banks that the research focused 
on received a 0.8 percentage point discount, which lowered their borrowing 
costs on all their liabilities, including bonds and customer deposits.  The 
value of that discount totaled at an $83 billion subsidy per year.  The re-
search also showed that the top five banks accounted for $64 billion of the 
subsidy’s amount, which roughly equals to these banks’ annual profits. 
Fourth, a study interpreting different investments options’ preferences 
shows that the preferences result from an implicit government guarantee to 
the biggest banks.  Specifically, the study showed that a long position in the 
stock portfolio of the biggest U.S. banks and a short position in the stock 
portfolio of smaller banks underperforms an equally risky portfolio of all 
nonbank stocks and government and corporate bonds by approximately 
eight percent per year over thirty-nine years. This difference is the result of 
an implicit government guarantee to the biggest banks.118 
Fifth, exploring the differences in funding costs between the biggest 
banks and all other banks, a study showed that credit default swap (CDS) 
spreads were reduced by twenty-three basis points precrisis and fifty-six ba-
sis points postcrisis due to subsidies granted to the twenty biggest banks.119  
The study researched the differences in funding costs in two stages for the 
period November 2001 through May 2010.  The authors first calculated the 
difference between an observed CDS spread to an estimated “fair market” 
CDS spread using data from the equities market for all banks in the data-
base.  The authors then paralleled the observed and estimated fair market 
CDS spreads between the biggest banks and smaller ones.  The database 
used included information on the twenty biggest and sixty-three other banks 
that have CDS spreads and other publicly available data.120 
 
83-billion-in-2013/17828-bloomberg-us-subsidy-to-wall-street-the-amount-of-sequester-cuts-it-s-83-
billion-in-2013; Linette Lopez, Elizabeth Warren Grilled Ben Bernanke On The Subsidy For ‘Too Big 
To Fail’ Banks (4:06 pm, Feb. 26 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/elizabeth-warren-on-bank-
subsidy-2013-2. 
 118 Ghandi Priyank & Hanno Lustig, Size Anomalies in U.S. Bank Stock Returns: A Fiscal Explana-
tion, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES. (Dec. 28, 2010), available at http://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w16553.pdf.  The authors created an equilibrium model of asset prices, adjusted it to match the 
subsidy, and decomposed it into a 3.10 percent subsidy to the biggest banks and a 3.25 percent disaster 
tax on the smallest banks.  The authors then multiplied the subsidy by the average market cap of the 
biggest U.S. banks to calculate the annual subsidy given to those banks, which totaled at $4.71 billion 
per bank in 2005 dollars. 
 119 Li Zan, Shisheng Qu & Jing Zhang, Quantifying the Value of Implicit Government Guarantees 




 120 Id.  Also focusing on CDS spreads, a different study total implicit bank subsidies of $121.17 bil-
lion from 2007 through 2010. See also Tsesmelidakis et al., supra note 23. 




Sixth, researching how predictions of government intervention during 
a financial crash lowered the price of financial sector collapse insurance, a 
study estimated that these predictions were valued at over $150 billion.121  
Specifically, measuring the price of a financial sector collapse insurance by 
index put options on the sector between January 2003 and June 2009, a 
study found that the public was not initially satisfied just by TARP, know-
ing that the funds would be used to purchase preferred shares that would 
dilute shareholders.  However, once government plans were announced 
concerning the purchase of toxic assets, the general bailout guarantee be-
came valuable.  The study used the difference between (i) the price of a 
basket of put options on specific banks, and (ii) the price of a put option on 
the financial sector index as the basis for calculating the size of a general 
bailout guarantee to the financial sector.  The authors used an asset pricing 
model with infrequent events to research the effect of industry-wide bailout 
guarantees on option prices.  The model can explain financial sector joint 
stock and option moments only when it incorporates a government bailout 
guarantee of the financial industry.  The model’s parameters helped deter-
mine the impact of the bailout guarantee on a bank’s expected return, and 
cost of capital in addition to the overall dollar size of the federal subsidy.122 
Seventh, focusing on market perception of risk of the biggest U.S. 
banks, a study calculated the difference in interest rates offered on unin-
sured and insured money market deposit accounts at banks in the period be-
tween 2005 and 2010.123  The study used money market deposit accounts 
with a (i) minimum deposit of $100,000 as their proxy for uninsured depos-
its, and (ii) $25,000 as their proxy for insured deposits, and calculated the 
difference in the interest rates offered on those accounts. The authors inter-
preted the differences as the market perception of risk of the banks, and cal-
culated the difference-in-difference of those rates between big and small 
banks.  They found that bigger banks paid a lower risk premium than small-
er banks,124 and concluded that an unexplained residual difference in risky 
deposit rates between the biggest and the smallest banks exists, as the big-
gest banks paid up to 45 basis points less in risk premiums for uninsured 
deposits.125 
Finally, using on FDIC data on banks, a study calculated the difference 
between (i) the average quarterly cost of funds for banks that held assets 
worth less than $100 billion and (ii) the average quarterly cost of funds for 
 
 121 See Bryan Kelly et al., supra note 23. 
 122 Id. 
 123 See Jacewitz, supra note 8. 
 124 Id. The study also used Ordinary Least-Squares (OLS) Regressions, a generalized linear model-
ing technique that may be used to model a single response variable which has been recorded on at least 
an interval scale, to explore what part of the lower risk premiums that were paid by the biggest banks 
could not be explained by other potential noticeable differences in risk across those banks. 
 125 Id. 
1PACKIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/29/15  1:35 PM 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 35:229 (2015) 
252 
banks with assets worth more than $100 billion for the periods (a) 2000–
2007, and (b) the last quarter of 2008 through the first quarter of 2009.  The 
study then calculated the difference-in-differences between the two time pe-
riods and concluded that a major subsidy exists.126  This subsidy is a fund-
ing cost advantage of twenty-nine basis points for banks with more than 
$100 billion in assets for the first period, which increased to seventy-eight 
basis points for the second period.  The increase—of forty-nine basis 
points— represents an annual subsidy of $34 billion to eighteen banks with 
more than $100 billion in assets in the first quarter of 2009.127 
On top of the general implicit TBTF subsidy calculated above, based 
on published data, the biggest U.S. banks have arguably benefited from 
three other sources of financial benefits: (i) deposit insurance, which allows 
banks to lower their risk profile and thus function with less capital and a 
lower cost of funds, without paying a fair “market premium” for the insur-
ance;128 (ii) the discount window, which provides credit to solvent but illiq-
uid banks even when other sources of credit may not be available allowing 
them to fund riskier and less-liquid asset portfolios at a lower cost and on a 
much larger scale;129 and (iii) access to the Federal Reserve’s large-dollar 
electronic payments system, through which banks with reserve or clearing 
accounts at a Federal Reserve Bank may transfer balances to other institu-
tions with similar accounts. Because such transfers are “guaranteed” when 
initiated, the Federal Reserve assumes the intra-day credit risk that certain 
banks will not have enough funds to discharge obligations. When banks that 
incur intra-day overdrafts do not pay a market rate for such government 
protection they essentially get a government-provided financial subsidy.130 
In addition, it appears that TBTF subsidies are not only arguably mas-
sive in volume, but also vital for the banks’ functioning.131  A recent report 
estimated that two of the biggest financial institutions in the U.S.—Bank of 
America Corp and Citigroup Inc.—were much more dependent on govern-
mental backstops than similarly sized competitors and that their profits 
would have been negative if not for the government subsidies.132  The re-
port stated that “[f]inancial sector CEOs have relied on taxpayer support. 
They have benefitted from express taxpayer bailouts as well as secret “back 
door” deals.  They continue to lead companies that seem to make profit but 
 
 126 See Baker & McArthur, supra note 23. (The study showed that while there could have been other 
explanations, after adjusting for such potential explanations, the spread between the two groups of banks 
potentially increased by 9 basis points following the crisis.  This result, the study argues, represents an 
annual TBTF subsidy of $6.3 billion, which may only be temporary.) 
 127 Id. 
 128 James, A. Wilcox & , Joe Peek, Safety Net Subsidies in Banking: Decline, Resurgence, and Pro-
spects, June 24, 2001, http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/groups/finance/SNS—v2.1—062401.pdf. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 See The Motley Fool, supra note 24; Robert Johnson, supra note 7, at 9. 
 132 See Robert Johnson, supra note 7, at 9. 




actually only thrive because of government subsidies and taxpayer sup-
port.”133  Likewise, a 2012 study demonstrated that the subsidies that the 
biggest U.S. banks received were roughly equivalent to their profits during 
the four quarters prior to June 2012.134 
 3. Big Banks v. TBTF Subsidies 
Despite former Chairman Bernanke’s statements, experts’ predictions, 
and the various studies calculating massive subsidies, as described above, 
not everyone agrees that the biggest banks receive massive subsidies, or any 
unique benefits.135  First, financial service organizations argue that many of 
the TBTF subsidies’ estimates were based on a flawed methodology, and 
unreliable financial data that was collected before the passage of the Dodd-
Frank Act.136  But it seems unreasonable that so many different TBTF sub-
sidies’ estimates, which all point at massive combined financial advantages 
and subsidies137 for the biggest U.S. banks are all so off.  Indeed, after esti-
mates of the subsidies’ size were published in the media,138 shocking the 
financial markets, many economists attempted to assess the subsidies’ size 
independently using different methodologies, and many found massive 
numbers too.139 
Second, financial service organizations and certain commentators ar-
gue that due to recent regulation, including the Dodd-Frank Act, the ad-
vantage of “systemically important” fiscal institutions was reduced, or even 
turned into a disadvantage,140 and that consequently there is no need for fur-
ther regulation.141  Specifically, several banks, including Goldman Sachs, 
 
 133 Id. 
 134 Charles W. Murdock, supra, note 25, at 505. 
 135 See, e.g., Press Release, Financial Services Forum et al., Financial Industry Addresses Alleged 
Large Bank Subsidy 1 (Mar. 11, 2013), http://images.politico.com/global/2013/03/10/financial_ 
industry_addresses_alleged_large_bank_subsidy_11_march_13.html. 
 136 Id. 
 137 See Top Banking Analyst: Subsidies to Giant Banks Exceed $780 Billion Dollars Per Year, 
WASHINGTONS BLOG (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2013/03/top-banking-analyst-
subsidies-to-giant-banks-exceed-780-billion-year.html. The most extreme estimate of subsidies included 
(i) 360 billion in Federal Reserve subsidies; (ii) $120 billion in federal deposit insurance; (iii) $100 bil-
lion in government-guaranteed loans; (iv) at least $100 billion in monopolistic advantages in the sec-
ondary market for home mortgages; and (v) more than $100 billion in fees in the over-the-counter 
(OTC) derivative market. Id. 
 138 See Ivry, supra note 22. 
 139 See, e.g., Baker et al., supra note. 23; Warburton, et al., supra note 6; Kelly, et al., supra note 23; 
Tsesmelidakis, et al., supra note 23 (arguing that wealth transfers to investors reached $365 billion in 
2007 2010). 
 140 See Stogin et al. supra note 13 (arguing that the biggest U.S. banks enjoyed a funding advantage 
of 6 basis points on average between 1999–2007 that increased during the crisis, but then reversed to a 
10 basis points disadvantage). 
 141 Alison Fitzgerald, Banks Seek To Sway Critical GAO Report, FORBES (Jan. 17, 2014 6:00AM), 
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have released reports that argue that any cost advantage they had during the 
crisis has shrunk with the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act,142 with Michel 
Araten of JPMorgan particularly reasoning that the TBTF subsidy’s shrink-
ing resulted in about 18 basis points.  Araten also contended that this basis 
would likely get smaller because of new regulations that will result in the 
liquidation rather than the bailing out of major banks in future crises.143 
Despite the megabanks’ attempts to prove that their advantages would 
become insignificant, they have only been able to point to one independent 
academic research team that has found that the megabanks market ad-
vantages diminished because of Dodd-Frank rules.  Professors Ken Cyree 
and Bhanu Balasubramanian concluded that the Dodd-Frank Act has effec-
tively reduced but did not eliminate too-big-to-fail discounts.144  Moreover, 
while the Dodd-Frank Act does attempt to put a stop to the TBTF taxpayer-
funded benefits145 by forcing SIFIs to internalize the costs and risks of their 
activities146 and by prohibiting the Federal Reserve from making extraordi-
nary loans to them, it has not yet offered a real solution to end the prob-
lem.147  The Dodd-Frank Act also does not prohibit the government from 
giving financial support framed in a more general fashion.148  As a result, 
government implicit and explicit subsidies and transfers from taxpayers to 
SIFIs and their shareholders continue.149 
Third, financial service organizations and research teams offer a wide 
array of additional arguments as to why no TBTF subsidies actually ex-
ist.150  For example, JPMorgan’s Michel Araten argued that financial mar-




 142 See Financial Services Forum, supra note 135. 
 143 Michel Araten & Christopher M Turner, Understanding the Funding Cost Differences between 
Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) and Non-G-SIBs in the United States (Mar. 11, 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2226939. 
 144 Ken Cyree & Bhanu Balasubramanian, Has Market Discipline on Banks Improved after the 
Dodd-Frank Act?, (Nov. 2, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2349042. 
 145 See Kaper, supra note 26 (reporting that President Obama declared, “Because of this law , . . . 
[t]here will be no more taxpayer-funded bailouts. Period.”). 
 146 See Wilmarth, supra note 27, at 713. 
 147 See generally Lawrance L. Evans, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-174T, 
GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES STATUTORY CHANGES TO LIMIT FUTURE 
SUPPORT ARE NOT YET FULLY IMPLEMENTED (Jan. 8, 2014), available at 
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&Hearing_ID=88d4a
a7d-32c3-4bb1-8ccb-a0c917bfb2e7&Witness_ID=0a2a4210-c333-4bfa-a896-0e6a37825657. 
 148 See Skeel, supra note 4. 
 149 See Bloomberg, supra note 7. 
 150 See, e.g., Michael Araten, Credit Ratings as Indicators of Implicit Government Support for 
Global Systemically Important Banks, SOC. SC. RESEARCH NETWORK (May 31, 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2272800. 




banks.151  Similarly, the Clearing House Association, which has an advoca-
cy and research division as well, launched a series of working papers on 
touting the value of big banks.  It released a study examining what it called 
“10 Myths” about systemically important banks, and supported the work of 
Professor Randall Kroszner of the University of Chicago, that suggests that 
large companies in every industry have lower costs than smaller ones and 
that this is not related to subsidies or unique to banking.152  However, even 
if the largest nonbanks and nonfinancial corporations in many industries do 
have lower costs of credit than their smaller peers, a recent Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York study has shown, using information from bonds issued 
over the past two decades, that a comparison across the largest (i) banks, 
(ii) nonbanks, (iii) and nonfinancial corporations, reveals that the largest 
banks have a relatively larger cost advantage vis-à-vis their smaller peers.  
This difference is consistent with the theory that investors believe some 
banks are TBTF.153 
Finally, as mentioned previously, certain commentators argue that 
scale economies in banking exist,154 and benefit the entire society, making 
the megabanks’ situation a unique one, which justifies government financial 
support.155  Put differently, megabanks argue that their added value that 
looks like a TBTF subsidy really is not, but reflects their economies of scale 
and scope, which enable them to create benefits that are passed on to their 
customers and investors, and lower the costs of finance for society.156 
However, economies of scale arguments as justifications for mega-
banks are problematic for several reasons.  First, it is still debatable whether 
 
 151 Id. (arguing that the market implied ratings for small banks are closer to the issuer ratings, while 
those for big banks track the standalone, unsupported ratings more closely than they do the ratings, 
which have built-in implicit government support). 
 152 See Fitzgerald, supra note 18; see generally Randall S. Kroszner, A Review of Bank Funding 
Cost Differentials, SOC. SC. RESEARCH NETWORK (Nov. 16, 2013), available at 
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/randall.kroszner/research/pdf/Kroszner%20Bank%20Funding%20Cost
%20Difs%20Nov%202013.pdf. 
 153 See Santos, supra note 3 (“The largest banks that issue bonds rated double-A and single-A bene-
fit from a discount (relative to their smaller peers) that is larger by 92 and 16 basis points, respectively, 
than the discount that the largest nonbank financials that issue bonds with those same ratings enjoy 
(relative to their smaller peers), though the difference is only statistically significant in the former case.  
When compared to the largest nonfinancial corporations, the largest banks that issue bonds rated double-
A and single-A benefit from an additional discount of 53 and 50 basis points, respectively, though only 
the latter difference is statistically significant.”). 
 154 See supra all sources at note 15. 
 155 Loretta J. Mester, Scale Economies in Banking and Financial Regulatory Reform, FED. RES. 
BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, THE REGION (Sept. 1, 2010), available at 
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=4535#_ftnref12; Joseph P. 
Hughes & Loretta Mester, Who Said Large Banks Don’t Experience Scale Economies? Evidence from a 
Risk-Return-Driven Cost Function, (Fed. Res. Bank of Phila., Working Paper 13-13, 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2256059 (finding evidence of economies of scale for banks with more than 
$100 billion in assets, after controlling for TBTF-related funding advantages.). 
 156 Schildbach, Universal Banks, supra note 17. 
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the biggest banks actually do better due to economies of scale advantages.  
Indeed, not only have certain studies concluded that no true economies of 
scale exist even though megabanks do have unique business mixes and ge-
ographic footprints,157 but some studies have showed that what might ap-
pear to be economies of scale is really TBTF subsidies.  Specifically, stud-
ies have shown that when examined from a standard model of bank 
production that does not control for TBTF funding cost advantages, scale 
economies were found, but, when examined under an enhanced model that 
adjusts the price of debt using implicit funding subsidies, no evidence of 
scale economies was found.158  Second, even among those that argue for the 
existence of economies of scale, it is not clear what is the magic cutoff size 
of a bank should be in order for such a bank to enjoy this advantage.159  
Third, advocating for bigger banks because of economies of scale is not 
recommended.  Recent studies have clearly shown that the biggest banks 
are much more likely to take additional, excessive risks, and relying on the 
government to save them if needed.160  Thus, even if according to profes-
sors Hughes and Mester evidence of economies of scale for banks with 
more than $100 billion in assets do exist, and such banks might provide 
some cost advantages to the economy, they are also the ones most likely to 
jeopardize the soundness of the financial system.161  Large banks are simply 
riskier than smaller banks and create more systemic risk, especially when 
they have insufficient capital or unstable funding.  Fourth, bigger does not 
necessarily mean better.  Several recent studies have suggested that small 
 
 157 Harvard Winters, Where Are the Economies of Scale We Were Promised?, AM. BANKER (June 6, 
2013, 3:00 PM), available at http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/where-are-the-economies-of-
scale-we-were-promised-1059663-1.html (“[O]f the 25 U.S. depository institutions with more than $25 
billion of assets, . . . [l]ine these institutions up in size order and you’ll see that despite the huge differ-
ence in assets between the top four and everyone else, there’s no . . . advantage to being big.  The $65-
billion asset Comerica (CMA) has essentially the same overhead/AA ratio (2.66%) as JPMorgan Chase 
(2.65%)” [worth $2.39 trillion at that time].). 
 158 Richard Davies & Belinda Tracey, Too Big to Be efficient? The Impact of Too big to Fail factors 
on Scale Economies for Banks, BANK OF ENGLAND, 2012, https://www.tilburguniversity.edu/ 
upload/ccf58f26-955d-4d0e-89ef-76ef7e86939c_daviestracey.pdf. 
 159 “Early studies found that economies of scale in banks disappear after the first $50 billion in as-
sets . . . Recent studies show that economies of scale also exist for larger banks, and are $16–$45 billion 
per year for the U.S. banking system . . . This is about 0.2% of the $20 trillion size of the US banking 
system.  But about a third of these economies realises in riskier capital-market activities of banks.  So 
the risk-adjusted economies of scale may be less than 0.2%.  (Note also that, from the perspective of 
economic efficiency, the economies of scale pale in comparison to the estimated $6–$12 trillion cost of 
the recent financial crisis. . .)  Overall, the too-big-to-fail subsidies, at 0.25% of assets, appear more im-
portant in driving bank size than the economies of scale, at less than 0.2% of assets.”  See Lev Ratnovski 
& Luc Laeven, Hui Tong, Are Banks Too Large?, IMF (May 31, 2014), available at http://blog-
imfdirect.imf.org/2014/05/14/are-banks-too-large-maybe-maybe-not/. 
 160 See Afonso, Santos & Traina, supra note 3. 
 161 See Hughes & Mester, supra note 155, at 32 (“We do not know if the benefits of large size out-
weigh the potential costs in terms of systemic risk that large scale may impose on the financial sys-
tem.”). 




banks can be more efficient than their large counterparts, and Harvard Uni-
versity’s Professor Mark Roe has analyzed the danger with any implicit 
TBTF subsidy pushing firms to be too-big-to-manage and compared this 
effect to a corporate poison pill, which disrupts the actions of both outsiders 
and insiders.162 
After analyzing all of the above regarding the scope of the arguable 
TBTF subsidies, it is evident that TBTF subsidies do exist, and that no oth-
er theory can explain and justify all the related anomalies, studies’ results, 
and the behavior of various financial markets’ participants’ behavior.  
Moreover, three issues appear to be clear.  First, even if there is some merit 
in the megabanks’ self-promoting arguments against the existence of the 
subsidies, the studies of interest-free experts should be sorted out from re-
search undertaken by sophisticated lobbyists or those who work for big 
banks, and the professional opinions of those in the second category should 
not be viewed equally.163  Second, whether one believes that TBTF banks 
do receive massive subsidies or not, it is difficult to argue that providing 
such subsidies would prove to be objectively efficient and economically 
beneficial in the longer term.  Based on empirical studies of past subsidies 
by Harvard University’s Professor Barro’s, this seems to be very unlikely.  
Professor Barro showed that many multipliers from countless spending pro-
jects are well below 1.0, and the aggregate effect on GDP is effectively 
negative.164  Consequently, he stated that policy makers must be very cau-
tious when deciding about government subsidies using arguments based on 
Keynesian multipliers. Building up on this theory, certain commentators 
have argued that bank subsidies, should be put to a very heavy burden of 
justification, to ensure that they would not jeopardize the country’s eco-
nomic health.165  Finally, while it is incredibly difficult to document and 
quantify the different potential elements of support to the biggest banks, al-
so due to transparency problems, even partial estimates point at the banking 
 
 162 See Yi-Kai Chen, Eric J. Higgins & Joseph. R. Mason, Economies of Scale in the Banking Indus-
try: The Effects of Loan Specialization (Drexel University Working Paper, 2004), available at 
http://www.ibrarian.net/navon/page.jsp?paperid=1174167&searchTerm=bank+profit; Davies & Tracey, 
supra note 158 (finding scale economies at big banks may be driven by TBTF advantages); Mark Roe, 
Structural Corporate Degradation Due to Too-Big-To-Fail Finance, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1419, 1419 
(arguing that a major retardant to industrial firm overexpansion has gone missing for large financial 
firms when “(1) the funding boost that a firm captures by being too-big-to-fail sufficiently lowers the 
firm’s financing costs, and (2) a resized firm or the spun-off entities would lose that funding bene-
fit . . . .”).  Professor Roe compares this effect to a corporate poison pill.. Id. 
 163 Examining the GAO Study on Government Support for Bank Holding Companies: Hearing Be-
fore the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 117 (2014), (testimony of Si-
mon Johnson, Professor, MIT Sloan School of Mgmt.), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg89479/pdf/CHRG-113shrg89479.pdf. 
 164 See Barro, supra note 61. 
 165 Dale A. Oesterle, State and Local Government Subsidies for Businesses: A Siren’s Trap, 6 OHIO 
ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 491, 502 (2011). 
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sector receiving extremely large subsidies. 
 III. THE TBTF SUBSIDIES’ PERVERSE EFFECTS 
 A. TBTF Banks’ Competitive Advantage over Other Banks 
While the regulation of national banks and their subsidiaries’ activities 
is within Congress’ authority,166 subsidizing megabanks and discriminating 
in favor of them using taxpayers’ funds,167 hurts the economy and com-
merce.168  The competitive advantages the megabanks receive are mainly 
based on the government’s “guarantee” to their assets that are already pro-
tected by the FDIC—bank deposits, as well as access by the non-depository 
elements of the big banks to Federal Reserve loans.169  Partly due to their 
disadvantage, the smaller banks have not been able to fairly compete fairly 
with bigger banks,170 and following the 2008 financial crisis, many smaller 
banks have failed.171  And while it is not fair to say that the big banks 
caused such failures, the less favorable financial terms that smaller banks 
receive and the market perception of them as riskier, certainly contributed 
to these failures. 
Moreover, such failures negatively impact the U.S. economy and spe-
cifically interstate commerce.  For example, community banks, which con-
stitute approximately 98% of all U.S. banks,172 form a critical element of 
the banking industry.  Although they jointly hold only 14.2% of all banking 
 
 166 Visitorial Powers Final Rule, 23 NO. 1 OCC Q.J. 64, 2004 WL 2360332 (2004). 
 167 Paul Bucheit, The Average American Family Pays $6,000 a Year in Subsidies to Big Business, 
ALTERNET (Sept. 22, 2013), http://www.alternet.org/economy/average-american-family-pays-6000-
year-subsidies-big-business.  “Similarly, based on a conservative estimate the crisis cost $50,000 to 
$120,000 for every U.S. household.”  Rob Garver, Breaking Up the Big Banks: Here’s How to Do It, 
FISCAL TIMES (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2014/01/13/Three-Big-Ideas-
Breaking-Big-Banks. 
 168 Discriminating against smaller, union, or community banks by giving them less tax benefits and 
exemptions than to TBTF banks can be viewed as discriminatory taxation of out-of-state commerce that 
runs afoul of the Commerce Clause. 
 169 See Tyler Atkinson, David Luttrell and & Harvey Rosenblum, How Bad Was It? The Costs and 
Consequences of the 2007–09 Financial Crisis, FED. RES. BANK OF DALLAS, STAFF PAPERS (Jul. 20, 
2013), available at http://dallasfed.org/assets/documents/research/staff/staff1301.pdf; Garver, supra 
note 167. 
 170 Tanya D. Marsh, Community Banks Are Failing; Pawnshops Are Growing, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Aug. 25, 2013, 2:07 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tanya-d-marsh/community-banks-are-
faili_b_3813223.html (“Even before the Financial Crisis, smaller banks saddled with a growing regula-
tory burden found it difficult to compete with more efficient mega banks.”). 
 171 This includes commercial and investment banks, and savings and loan associations that were (i) 
were taken over or merged with another entity, (ii) were declared insolvent or liquidated, or (iii) had 
filed for bankruptcy.  A list of banks that were have been liquidated by the FDIC since Oct. 1, 2000 is 
available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html. 
 172 Tanya D. Marsh, Too Big to Fail Versus Too Small to Notice: Addressing the Commercial Real 
Estate Debt Crisis, 63 ALA. L. REV. 321, 371 (2012). 




institutions’ assets, community banks have played a significant role for in-
dividual consumers.173  Community banks offer approximately half of 
small-business loans and farm loans, more than one-third of commercial re-
al estate loans, and one-sixth of residential mortgage loans.  Moreover, 
community banks are exceptionally significant in rural America, where no 
other financial service providers are accessible to more than one-third of 
American districts.174  Nevertheless, the government is not too concerned 
by community banks’ failures,175 although it should be.  Similarly, recent 
banking regulation that has been imposed on big and small banks—mostly 
in order to address shortfalls in large banks’ functioning—does not help in-
crease smaller banks’ business activity.176 
Small banks do tend to rely on deposit insurance for funding, and ad-
vances from the Federal Home Loan Banks for mortgage lending much 
more than big banks, as those provide the smaller banks a fairly cheap 
source of capital, but deposit insurance does not significantly subsidize 
small banks.177  Therefore, while it is true that larger banks rely more heavi-
ly on bonds and other capital-market sources, there is moral hazard in-
volved with banks of all sizes, because deposits are covered by the FDIC, 
and that means most depositors know that they will not take losses if banks, 
big or small, fail.178  Additionally, deposits insurance is an explicit benefit 
that is fully paid for, especially by the smaller banks, unlike the after-the-
fact and unpaid implicit subsidies that the biggest banks enjoy, as well as 
their investors who do not suffer losses from their banks’ bad lending deci-
sions only because of government interventions.179 
 
 173 Tanya D. Marsh, Preserving Community Banks Should Be Bi-Partisan Priority, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Jul. 16, 2013, 2:41PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tanya-d-marsh/preserving-community-
bank_b_3602087.html. 
 174 Id. 
 175 See generally Marsh, supra note 172.  “In the current economic crisis, much attention has been 
paid to the financial institutions deemed ‘too big to fail.  At the other end of the spectrum are the small 
banks that policymakers view as ‘not systemically important’ and whose failure, therefore, is too minor 
to attract notice.  In the aggregate, however, those small banks are incredibly important.”  Id. at 379. 
 176 Joe Adler, Regulatory Relief Bills Gain Momentum in Congress, AM. BANKER (Jul. 30, 2013, 
4:03PM), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_146/regulatory-relief-bills-gain-momentum-in-
congress-1060984-1.html (discussing community banks’ protests about the burden and reach of new 
expansive regulation on them). 
 177 See Swagel, supra note 37. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id.  (Given this unfair advantage, a new regulatory change is meant to have the biggest banks pay 
insurance premiums to the FDIC on their nondeposit sources of funds too, even though these borrow-
ings are not covered by the federal guarantee and would take losses under Dodd-Frank Title II.  The idea 
is that deposits tend to be more stable than bonds and other capital market borrowings, so charging big 
banks for using less stable sources of funds provides an incentive against financial system volatility); 
Frequently Asked Questions: Lower Deposit-Insurance Assessment Rates for Community Banks, Inde-
pendent Community Bankers of America, http://www.icba.org/files/ICBASites/PDFs/HR2897FAQ.pdf.  
Additionally, “[b]ig banks, not small banks, are the major players in the market for short-term debt, 
which makes their bonds riskier than small banks’ bonds. So, if the market prices the big and small 
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 B. The Separation of Powers Issue 
It has long been determined that all “banking legislation, and federal 
regulation of finance in general, rest upon powers of Congress . . . to make 
all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing 
powers. . .”180  Using this power, Congress and the Office of the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency (OCC) have authorized national banks to do “as shall be 
deemed necessary to carry on the business of banking.”181  Notwithstanding 
the above, commentators have argued that Congress was not meant to have 
such broad powers to give subsidies such as the TBTF subsidies.182  Fol-
lowing up on these arguments, regulators took steps to limit the impact of 
the arguable TBTF subsidies.183  However, many still argue that the 
measures that were taken are not enough and that granting the TBTF subsi-
dies perversely impacts the separation of powers principle.184  While there 
are no explicit law or procedures about the government’s ability to give 
subsidies, it has become the norm that the government can and often does 
do so, despite historic debates about its power.185  As Treasury Secretary, 
Hamilton strongly supported federal aid, believing it would provide a 
strong economic basis, and believing that anything not explicitly prohibited 
by the Constitution was a legal and proper power of the federal govern-
ment.186  Jefferson had a different perspective, believing that the federal 
 
banks’ long-term debt similarly, even though the big banks’ debt is riskier, something must be giving 
the big banks’ riskier debt a boost.”  Mark Roe, The Costs of “Too Big To Fail,” Harvard Law School 
Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (June 26, 2013 at 5:43PM), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/06/26/the-costs-of-too-big-to-fail/. 
 180 See, e.g., Norman v. B. & O. R.R., 294 U.S. 240, 303 (1935); Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 
421, 439–440 (1884). 
 181 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 85 (2014). 
 182 See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 654–55 (1999)(Kennedy, J., dis-
senting) (discussing the need for federalism-based limits on spending); Lynn A. Baker, Conditional 
Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1945–57 (1995) (calling for stronger federal-
ism-based limits on the spending power); Lynn A. Baker, The Revival of States’ Rights: A Progress Re-
port and a Proposal, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 95, 102–03 (1998) (advocating for strengthening 
Dole’s conditional spending analysis); Glenn Cohen & James F. Blumstein, The Constitutionality of the 
ACA’s Medicaid-Expansion Mandate, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 103 (2012) (advocating for the Court to 
adopt a stronger coercion approach). 
 183 See e.g., 12 U.S.C.A. § 1851 (b)(1) (2014) (stating that “the Financial Stability Oversight Coun-
cil shall study and make recommendations on implementing the provisions of this section so as to” (C) 
“limit the inappropriate transfer of Federal subsidies from institutions that benefit from deposit insur-
ance and liquidity facilities of the Federal Government to unregulated entities”). 
 184 See Debra Cassens Weiss, Constitutionality of Bailout Law is Questioned, A.B.A. J., (Jan. 16, 
2009, 2:10 PM), available at http://www.abajournal.com/mobile/article/constitutionality_ 
of_bailout_law_is_questioned. 
 185 John C. Eastman, Restoring “General” to the General Welfare Clause, 4 CHAPL. REV. 63 (2001) 
(examining the understanding of the Spending Clause, and the competing interpretations of it offered by 
Madison, Jefferson, and Hamilton, who viewed the clause as a stand-alone grant of power). 
 186 In his famous 1791 Report, Hamilton proposed federal subsidies to promote manufacturing, and 




government should not exercise any power not explicitly granted to it by 
the Constitution.187  Today, despite debates over the scope and legitimacy 
of some subsidies, most industries receive government aid, directly or indi-
rectly.  Moreover, Hamilton’s view has been adopted, and Congress uses 
“the spending power and the conditional grant of federal funds” to achieve 
goals that are not included in the other enumerated powers.188 
However, while Congress has extremely broad subsidy-giving powers, 
taxpayers have an extremely limited ability to challenge federal spending in 
courts, due to restrictive standing rules.189  Such standing rules are not 
sound as they virtually insulate federal spending from review.190  Fortunate-
ly, however, these rules can be changed.  Standing is described as “one of 
‘the most amorphous [concepts] in the entire domain of public law,’”191 and 
the doctrine of standing is “continuously evolving,”192 especially, in the 
context of taxpayer standing.  In the last several decades, a number of key 
Supreme Court decisions dealt with federal taxpayer suits.  But while the 
 
made clear that he thought Congress was authorized grant subsidies. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 
REPORT ON MANUFACTURES, 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 971, 1033 (Dec. 5, 1791), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/ah/rpt_manufactures.pdf,. 
 187 A generation later, with highly debated transportation subsidies, the controversy over the consti-
tutionality of subsidies was still relevant.  Ultimately, the Civil War concluded the controversy, and the 
rise of the Republican Party confirmed that subsidies would continue.  Following the Civil War, Repub-
licans assertively encouraged subsidies for manufacturers in various industries, and under the Newlands 
Reclamation Act, the government spent billions on reclamation projects.  See generally Howard Gill-
man, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Further Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United 
States, 1875–1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511, 513 (2002) (arguing that the Republican Party expanded 
federal jurisdiction to have courts promote its economic agenda). 
 188 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206–07 (1987)(“[T]he power of Congress to authorize 
expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power 
found in the Constitution.’ Thus, objectives not thought to be within Article I’s ‘enumerated legislative 
fields’ may nevertheless be attained through the use of the spending power and the conditional grant of 
federal funds.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 189 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486–88 (1923) decided with Frothingham v. 
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486–88 (1923) (dismissing a suit brought by a taxpayer that challenged the feder-
al Maternity Act, arguing that the Act would lead to an increase of her future taxes.  The Court ruled that 
the causal link between federal spending and taxpayers’ injury is uncertain, and that a taxpayer would 
need to show that he “sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury . . . and not 
merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally”); Duke Power Co. v. 
Greenwood County, 302 U.S. 485, 490 (1938); Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 478–79 
(1938). 
 190 Cf. Ryan C. Squire, Note, Effectuating Principles of Federalism: Reevaluating the Federal 
Spending Power as the Great Tenth Amendment Loophole, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 872, 872 (1998). 
 191 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968)(quoting Hearing on S. 2097 before the Subcomm. on 
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 89th Cong. 467–68 (1966) (statement of Prof. 
Paul A. Freund) (alteration in Flast)). 
 192 For commentary suggesting that standing doctrine is a creature of evolution, see Eric J. Kuhn, 
Standing: Stood Up at the Courthouse Door, 63 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 886, 887 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, 
What’s Standing after Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 168–
97 (1992). 
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Supreme Court in Flast193  expanded taxpayers’ standing, the recent Cu-
no194  and Winn195 decisions made it clear that the Court is retreating from 
broader standing options.196 And in the recent Hein case the Court seemed 
to indicate that its past exception could apply only to funding made in ac-
cordance with specific legislative action.197  Thus, taxpayers will not be 
able to challenge subsidies such as the TBTF ones as they are not articulat-
ed in a specific legislation. 
But more importantly, the recent Hein decision is problematic because 
it makes the executive branch’s unchecked spending hazardous.198  Allow-
ing the executive branch to spend money without any review risks constitu-
tional violations, because not giving the courts the power to hear cases 
questioning the executive branch’s activity can conflict with the balance of 
power.199  Similarly, referring specifically to the bailouts and TBTF subsi-
dies, certain commentators have argued that “Congress has no constitution-
al authority to delegate nearly plenary legislative power to the Treasury sec-
retary, an executive branch official,” as it conflicts with the balance of 
powers principle,200 when one authority is receiving the other authority’s 
power rather than help with checks and balances. 
 
 193 Flast supra note 191, at 99 (creating a limited exception to a prohibition against federal taxpayer 
suits, the Court mentioned a two-part test that federal taxpayers must pass to have a sufficient “taxpay-
er’s stake in the outcome” to justify standing. First, establishing “a logical link between status and the 
type of legislative enactment attacked,” and Second, “the taxpayer must establish a nexus between that 
status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged.”).  Following Flast, however, 
there was a retreat from the broader application in the Court’s decisions.  See generally Edward A. Zel-
insky, Putting State Courts In The Constitutional Driver’s Seat: State Taxpayer Standing After Cuno 
and Winn, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 1 (2012). 
 194 Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 332 (2006). In Daimler, municipal and state tax-
payers challenged the constitutionality of two Ohio tax provisions. Id. The Court dismissed the chal-
lenge, as “state taxpayers have no standing under Article III to challenge state tax or spending decisions 
simply by virtue of their status as taxpayers.” Id. 
 195 Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 658 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2011), aff’d, 131 S.Ct. 1436, at 
1440 (2011). 
 196 Edward A. Zelinsky, supra note 193, at 35.  Putting State Courts In The Constitutional Driver’s 
Seat: State Taxpayer Standing After Cuno And Winn, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 1 , 35 (2012). 
 197 Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, 551 U.S. 587 (2007). At issue in Hein, was Presi-
dent Bush’s creation of an Office that was meant to ensure that faith-based groups would be eligible to 
compete for federal assistance, as long as they did not use funding toward religious activities; since no 
congressional legislation authorized the Office or appropriated money for its activities, the Court dis-
missed the taxpayers’ claims that the support violated the Establishment Clause as unlike in Flast, they 
had not established a sufficient nexus between their status and the power to tax and spend. 
 198 Regina Kaley, Note, Can Taxpayers Stand Discrimination?: Lack of Standing and the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act Permits the Executive Branch to Fund Discrimination Within Religious Or-
ganizations, 49 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 195, 206–207 (2010). 
 199 Id. 
 200 See Weiss, supra note 184. 




 C. Honesty is the Best Policy? No Transparency 
It is a long-settled doctrine that “[t]he question of the constitutionality 
of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which 
it undertakes to exercise.”201  But if the federal government can and does 
grant TBTF banks massive subsidies, Congress should be encouraged to 
transparently disclose the basis on which it grants such massive subsidies.  
Especially, as large parts of non-cash political interventions with TBTF 
banks are difficult to quantify, the data necessary to do so is deficient, and 
many government programs across different agencies have some involve-
ment with the financial sector, which measuring the subsidies even more 
complicated. 
Given the TBTF subsidies’ estimated volume, their non-transparent 
nature, and the fragmented data available on them, providing them results 
in two transparency-related perverse effects.  First, and most importantly, it 
creates a norm, which conflicts with democratic governance procedures.  It 
conflicts with establishing an independent and transparent constitutional re-
view mechanism that exists in other countries.202  Although “it has long 
been a value in liberal constitutional regimes that regulation be transpar-
ent,”203 and despite the fact that some of the American founding fathers dis-
cussed the need for the legislative branch to be open to the public, while 
trying to advance certain political interests204 the Constitution imposes no 
structural, uniform openness requirement upon Congress. Rather, it creates 
specific and limited disclosure practices,205 and dictates that only Congress 
can impose procedural rules upon itself.206  And while Congress has not 
created such rules, it cannot ignore its responsibility to show for each sub-
sidy policy the relevant circumstances on which it based the decision to 
provide federal support.207  And, if the circumstances based on which Con-
gress decided to provide support change, then a “continuous and vigilant 
 
 201 Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948). 
 202 “[T]he United States government and administration is less transparent than other nations: A law 
like the 2001 EC Regulation that offers the citizens of the Union access to virtually all correspondence 
and other documents kept and sent by one of the three organs of the EU surpasses any FOIA attempt to 
transparency by far.”  Marci A. Hamilton & Clemens G. Kohnen, The Jurisprudence of Information 
Flow: How the Constitution Constructs the Pathways of Information, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 267, 289–93 
(2003). 
 203 Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L.REV. 501, 
533 (1999). 
 204 See Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
361, 415 (2004). 
 205 Mark Fenster, Seeing the State: Transparency as Metaphor, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 617, 638 (2010). 
 206 Id. at 76; Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to Congress: Earmark Rules and Statutory Interpretation, 
94 CORNELL L. REV. 519, 529–33 (2009). 
 207 STAFF OF JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 89TH CONG., REP. ON SUBSIDY AND SUBSIDY–EFFECT 
PROGRAMS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 1 (Comm. Print 1965). 
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reexamination” of the subsidy, and the justification to continue it is due.208  
According to Congressional Committee findings, federal programs that are 
meant to support the economic position of particular groups should be fre-
quently reexamined considering the changing circumstances.  “Regardless 
to their original justification, subsidy plans should be so contrived as to 
eradicate the necessity for their continuation.  The broad changes which 
must be expected in our economy require continuing revision in the scope 
and character of these plans if they are to accomplish their purposes.”209 
Second, it seems fair to argue that the lack of information or transpar-
ency concerning the TBTF subsidies hurts predictability in and stability of 
the financial markets, as major banks and investors are not sure what to re-
alistically expect.210 
 D. Too Big To Jail 
Following the financial crisis, it has become known that one of the 
perverse effects of the TBTF problem is the government’s “deferred prose-
cution” policy for big banks that violate criminal laws.211  This policy, 
which is legal,212 was nicknamed too-big-to-jail, and causes more and more 
anger,213 as reports about the biggest banks’ wrongdoings keep getting re-
leased.214  Trying to justify this policy, Attorney General Holder explained 
that the DOJ could not indict big banks because that might harm the econ-
omy.215  Further demonstrating this policy, in 2013 JPMorgan reached a 
 
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. 
 210 See generally Kensil E. Sean & Margraf Kaitlin, The Advantage of Failing First: Bear Stearns v. 
Lehman Brothers, 22 J. OF APPLIED FINANCE 2 (2012) (discussing why Lehman was forced into bank-
ruptcy, while Bear Stearns was bailed out). 
 211 See generally Nizan Geslevich Packin, Breaking Bad: Big Banks Not Guilty As Not Charged, 91 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1089 (2014); Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps 
Giving in to Wall Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REV., 1283, 1428 (2013); Jessica Silver-Greenberg, HSBC to Pay 
Record Fine to Settle Money-Laundering Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2012, at B3, available at 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/11/hsbc-to-pay-record-fine-to-settle-money-laundering-
charges/?_r=0. 
 212 “[F]ederal prosecutors in the United States possess broad discretion to pursue criminal charges, 
or not, against organizations. . . [their] guidelines lay out a set of factors that them-selves permit broad 
discretion.” See Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 1789 
(2011). 
 213 Press Release, Oregon Senator Jeff Merkley, Merkley Blasts “Too Big to Jail” Policy for Law-
breaking Banks, JEFF MERKLEY UNITED STATE SENATOR FOR OREGON (Dec. 13, 2012) available at 
http://www.merkley.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id=42a606e4-7c45-42ed-8348-c77c508f9281 
(Senator Merkley blasted the DOJ for its policy and demanded explanations). 
 214 See, e.g., Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, JPMorgan Is Penalized $2 Billion Over 
Madoff, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/07/jpmorgan-settles-with-
federal-authorities-in-madoff-case/; Is EVERY Market Rigged?, WASHINGTONSBLOG, (May 19, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2013/05/is-every-market-rigged.html. 
 215 Eric Holder, testifying before a Senate committee said that he is “concerned that the size of some 




$13-billion settlement with the government for the bank’s role in creating 
the 2008 mess.216  And even though the government declared that this does 
not release JPMorgan from potential prosecution,217 megabanks typically 
receive deferred or nonprosecution agreements, and based on such settle-
ments avoid indictment or convictions.218 
Letting JPMorgan and other banks escape criminal liability, much like 
not prosecuting the individuals who managed those banks,219 discriminates 
against smaller banks and disregards principles of equality under the law.220  
Many commentators argue that the biggest banks’ executives and managers 
behaved unethically and helped fuel the financial crisis, yet such individu-
als typically do not get prosecuted.221  Accordingly, it is fair to argue that 
the too-big-to-jail policy encourages criminal behavior as it incentivizes 
banks to continue behaving unethically.  Certainly, a simple cost-benefit 
analysis shows that even if a fine is greater than a criminally obtained prof-
it, which is usually not the case, such a fine can be paid by committing 
more crimes in the future,222 for which the banks and their executives will 
probably not face criminal liability.223 
 
of these institutions becomes so large that it does become difficult for us to prosecute them when we are 
hit with indications that if you do prosecute, if you do bring a criminal charge, it will have a negative 
impact on the national economy, perhaps even the world economy.” See Peter Schroeder, Holder: Big 
Banks’ Size Complicates Prosecution Efforts, THE HILL, (Mar. 6, 2013), available at 
http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/banking-financial-institutions/286583-holder-big-banks-size-
complicates-prosecution-efforts#ixzz2fxmQO2Uk. 
 216 See Peter Eavis & Ben Protess, Considering the Fairness of JPMorgan’s Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
22, 2013, at B1, available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/10/21/considering-the-fairness-of-
jpmorgans-deal/. 
 217 Danielle Kurtzleben, Potential Criminal Charges Loom, but JPMorgan May Remain Too Big to 
Jail, US NEWS (Nov. 19, 2013, 5:41 PM), available at http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/ 
2013/11/19/potential-criminal-charges-loom-but-jpmorgan-may-remain-too-big-to-jail. 
 218 Id. 
 219 “[N]ot a single high level executive has been successfully prosecuted in connection with the re-
cent financial crisis, and given the fact that most of the relevant criminal provisions are governed by a 
five-year statute of limitations, it appears very likely that none will be.” Jed S. Rakoff, Why Have No 
High Level Executives Been Prosecuted In Connection With The Financial Crisis?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS 
(Jan. 9, 2014), available at  http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/jan/09/financial-crisis-why-
no-executive-prosecutions/. Judge Rakoff is a Southern District of New York Federal Judge. 
 220 Id. 
 221 “[T]he prevailing view. . . the crisis was in material respects the product of intentional fraud. . . 
[accordingly] the widespread conclusion that fraud at every level permeated the bubble in mortgage-
backed securities.”  Id. 
 222 John Titus, How Obama Surrendered Sovereignty To The Criminal Banking Cartel, THE DAILY 
BAIL, (Apr. 24, 2013, 5:33PM), http://dailybail.com/home/how-obama-surrendered-sovereignty-to-the-
criminal-banking-ca.html. 
 223 “Clearly, the government has bought into the notion that too big to fail is too big to jail. When 
prosecutors choose not to prosecute to the full extent of the law in a case as egregious as this, the law 
itself is diminished.” See Editorial, Too Big to Indict, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2012, at A38, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/opinion/hsbc-too-big-to-indict.html 
1PACKIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/29/15  1:35 PM 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 35:229 (2015) 
266 
 E. Negative Behavioral Incentives 
“Show me the money!”224 
Governments use subsidies as a tool to intervene in how businesses are 
conducted in certain industries, and to increase or decrease productivity in 
order to advance social or economic interests.  But subsidies often do much 
more than originally intended, creating or eliminating undesired incen-
tives,225 which result in unintended consequences.226  One example of such 
unintended consequence in the energy industry, to which the government 
gave $96.3 billion via sixty different subsidies between 2005–2009, is the 
increasing of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions.227  Focusing on energy, the 
government tried to increase production, subsidize consumption, and in-
crease energy efficiency.228  However, while these goals were not related to 
CO2 emissions, they nonetheless affected the CO2 emissions in the U.S. 
through their impact on the energy markets.  Accordingly, between 2005–
2008, energy-related subsidies had the net effect of increasing CO2 emis-
sions by an average of 47.3 million metric tons per year. Nevertheless, by 
2009, government spending shifted toward subsidies that had the exact op-
posite effect, and lowered CO2 emissions, creating a net effect of reducing 
CO2 emissions by 37.9 million metric tons.229 
The agriculture industry is another example of a subsidies-receiving 
 
 224 Jerry Maguire (Gracie Films, 1996). 
 225 The problems in giving subsidies to businesses include: (i) making businesses become spend-
thrift, as government intervention almost never helps push down costs; (ii) “investing in technology that 
is not economically viable,” because subsidies are typically not driven by market demands; (iii) dis-
torting business decisions, and inducing companies to put more production than is efficient; (iv) venture 
capitalists fund the best projects, and thus if venture capitalists “reject a project, it is difficult to believe 
that the government could do a better job of picking a winner.” See Removing the Barriers to Free En-
terprise and Economic Growth: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the budget, 112nd Cong. 19–20 
(2012).  See The Obama Administration’s Green Energy Gamble: Hearing Before House Comm. on 
Oversight & Gov’t Reform, Subcomm. on Reg. Aff., Stimulus Oversight, and Gov’t Spending, 112th 
Cong. 7 (2012) (statement of James Nelson, CEO, Solar3D), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg74453/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg74453.pdf. 
 226 See Edwards et al., supra note 39. 
 227 Pursuant to the EPA, “Carbon dioxide (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas emitted through hu-
man activities. In 2011, CO2 accounted for about 84% of all U.S. greenhouse gas emissions from human 
activities. Carbon dioxide is naturally present in the atmosphere as part of the Earth’s carbon cycle . . . 
Human activities are altering the carbon cycle—both by adding more CO2 to the atmosphere and by 
influencing the ability of natural sinks, like forests, to remove CO2 from the atmosphere.” See Carbon 
Dioxide Emissions, EPA.GOV, available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/ 
gases/co2.html (last visited March 9, 2015). 
 228 See MAURA ALLAIRE & STEPHEN P. A. BROWN, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, U.S. ENERGY 
SUBSIDIES: EFFECTS ON ENERGY MARKETS AND CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS 1 (Aug. 2012), available 
at http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/fiscal_and_ 
budget_policy/EnergySubsidiesFINALpdf.pdf.. 
 229 Id. 




industry, in which the subsidies resulted in many unintended consequences.  
Dating back to Roosevelt’s New deal Farm Program, which kept prices 
high in case of overproduction by paying farmers and then getting rid of 
their product, the government tried to control what it believed should be the 
right amount of production.230  Then, during Nixon’s presidency, the goal 
of subsidies was reversed, and the government encouraged production, by 
guaranteeing farmers an agreed minimum price for their harvests.231  Today, 
farmers get paid based not on their harvests, but on their size and produc-
tion history.232  However, some farmers receive more funds than others.  
Bigger farms get more funds than smaller farms, and four food crops—
corn, soy, wheat, and rice—receive approximately 60% of subsidy pay-
ments.  Directly related to their subsidies, these four food crops comprise 
approximately 66% of the calories consumed by Americans.233 Thus, gov-
ernment subsidies to farmers creating cheap corn, soy, wheat, and rice have 
direct and perhaps undesired impacts on the public’s health and nutrition 
.234 
Finally, a third example of subsidies’ unintended consequences is 
found in the fishing industry.  Research shows that subsidies in the fishing 
industry led to overfishing.  This is the result of increasing fishing efforts 
artificially and turning fishing into a more profitable industry than it really 
is,235especially as the subsidies are worth one-fifth of the value of the catch 
itself.236 
In the context of the banking sector, it appears that government subsi-
dies reinforce undesired incentives amongst banks’ executives resulting in 
unwanted consequences.237 Specifically, TBTF subsidies distort economic 
incentives and encourage banks to (i) excessively borrow,238 (ii) take exces-
sive risks,239 and (iii) expand into various unrelated industries.240 
The incentive to excessively borrow is a direct result of the subsidies 
banks receive.  Since the government support protects them, their deposi-
 
 230 See Yale Sustainable Food Project, available at http://www.yale.edu/sustainablefood/ 
S9256YSF_farm_bill_s.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2015). 
 231 Id. 
 232 Id. 
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. 
 235 See generally Sharp, R. and U.R. Sumaila, Quantification of U.S. Marine Fisheries Subsidies, 
North American Journal of Fisheries Management (Feb. 2009), available at 
http://www.lenfestocean.org/~/media/legacy/Lenfest/PDFs/subsidies_rsr_final.pdf?la=en. 
 236 Id. 
 237 See Wilmarth, supra note 27, at 707 (arguing that any regulatory reform’s main goals should be 
to eliminate TBTF subsidies and to mandate that SIFIs internalize the risks and costs of their activities.). 
 238 See ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES, 129–30 (2013). 
 239 See Wilmarth, supra note 27, at 707. 
 240 The Editors, What Are Banks Doing in Energy and Aluminum Anyway?, BLOOMBERG VIEW, (Jul. 
30, 2013, 8:00 AM) available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-30/why-are-banks-selling-
aluminum-anyway-.html. 
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tors and even their creditors and shareholders, all these constituents rely on 
government’s protection, which, as discussed above, enables big banks to 
get loans with more favorable terms.241  These improved terms give big 
banks incentives to prefer borrowing to other forms of funding for their in-
vestments.242  The preferential tax treatment of debt also contributes to this 
preference,243 because the more banks borrow, the bigger the subsidies they 
receive are.244  This incentive to have as little equity as possible and to 
over-borrow exposes the economy to financial risks.245 
Similar to the incentive to over-borrow, the incentive to take excessive 
risks, which already exists for various reasons,246 is also enhanced by the 
government’s grant of subsidies247 because they function like a guarantee.  
Indeed, it is typically the case that business subsidies encourage investing in 
very uncertain projects, as was also the case with Enron’s international in-
vestments, which contributed to Enron’s collapse.  Enron received $3.7 bil-
lion government subsidies for its foreign schemes, and subsidies from glob-
al agencies such as the World Bank,248 and those subsidies made possible 
Enron’s excessively risky foreign investments, which crashed around the 
time that Enron’s frauds were being discovered.249  Similar to Enron’s man-
agement, large banks’ executives expect to share in any profits that flow to 
the banks, but feel protected from losses that the realization of risks might 
inflict on the banks.  The main difference, however, is that losses inflicted 
on banks are in reality losses inflicted on banks’ depositors, bondholders, 
preferred shareholders, and, as demonstrated in the 2008 crisis, taxpay-
 
 241 See ADMATI et al., supra note 238, at 129–30. 
 242 Id. 
 243 Id. 
 244 Id. 
 245 Id. 
 246 See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 
247 (2010). 
 247 Surprisingly, there has been little discussion or agreement on what kind of risk-taking is actually 
excessive, or even how to define excessive risk.  See Wulf A. Kaal & Richard W. Painter, Initial Reflec-
tions on an Evolving Standard: Constraints on Risk Taking by Directors and Officers in Germany and 
the United States, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1433, 1438, 1440, 1449–50 (2010) (“[T]he concept[] of . . . 
‘excessive risk’ [is] controversial. Whether . . . there is any such thing as excessive risk, and if so, how 
excessive risk is to be defined, is another issue. . . . The credit crisis of 2008-2009 also convinced many 
observers that the level of risk in the financial sector was excessive. . . . The more hotly debated ques-
tion, however, is . . . [w]hich particular decisions by bankers were excessively risky, which were not, 
and how can one distinguish between the two? . . . Discerning excessive risk from other risk is highly 
subjective and an analysis likely to be undertaken differently in different cultural contexts . . . .  The 
predominant unit of analysis for defining excessive risk—the individual risk bearer or society as a 
whole—can be different in different cultural contexts.”) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 248 Jim Vallette & Daphne Wysham, Enron’s Pawns: How Public Institutions Bankrolled Enron’s 
Globalization Game 4, INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES (Mar. 22, 2002), available at 
http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/archives/reports/seen/pawns.pdf. 
 249 TIMOTHY P. CARNEY, THE BIG RIPOFF 209 (John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 2006). 




ers.250  And, as mentioned, subsidies augment the preexisting incentive to 
borrow more.251 Incentivizing banks to take excessive risks works against 
the regulators’ ineffective attempts to mandate that banks eschew excessive 
risks.252  These ineffective attempts, which resulted in the 2008 crisis, fully 
shifted corporate focus to strategic risk-taking,253 and as a result, the Dodd-
Frank Act focuses on risk-regulation.254 
Finally, the grant of government subsidies to the biggest banks also in-
centivizes them to expand, at the taxpayers’ expense, into unrelated indus-
tries like water utilities, electricity generation, natural gas distribution, and 
even the operation of municipal parking meters. 255 However,  since there is 
no valid economic reason for banks to be involved in such industries—and 
the banks’ only advantage is offering cheaper funding due to the subsidies 
they receive—critics argued following several banking scandals in 2013 
that banks should not meddle in unrelated industries.256 
 IV. NORMATIVE SOLUTIONS 
Thus far, in attempting to deal with the TBTF problem, regulators 
have entertained several solutions with distinct but reasonably complemen-
tary purposes.257 
 A. Capital and Liquidity Levels 
Receiving much attention, some argue that the best solution is requir-
ing banks to increase their liquidity and capital levels, with the goal of mak-
ing banks more resilient to financial market disruptions, while making cri-
 
 250 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 246, at 266 (identifying key factors that provided bank executives 
with excessive incentives to take risks, and stating that even “bondholders’ expected costs from exces-
sive risk-taking, and their incentives to limit such costs, are further reduced by the prospect that, in the 
event of bank failure, bondholders may benefit directly or indirectly from government funding even 
though they are not formally insured by the government. As financial institutions have grown larger 
over the last two decades, partly as a result of deregulation, it has become even more difficult for the 
government to commit to not bailing them out.”). 
 251 See ADMATI et al., supra note 238, at 129. 
 252 At least one court determined that while speculation is no longer imprudent per se, it is still un-
desired, which is why historical rules “broadly prohibited expansive categories of investments and tech-
niques classified as ‘speculative.’” Heidecker Farms, Inc. v. Heidecker, No. 09-1541, 10-0273, 2010 
WL 3894199, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2010). 
 253 Historically, business regulation has been passed in response to major breakdowns, which were 
related to excessive risk-taking in corporate America.  See generally David A. Skeel, Jr., Icarus and 
American Corporate Regulation, 61 BUS. LAW. 155 (2005). 
 254 See generally Packin, supra note 10. 
 255 See ADMATI et al., supra note 238. 
 256 Id. 
 257 See Barth, supra note 44. 
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ses, bailouts, and the grant of subsidies’ less likely.258 These commentators’ 
calls for financial institutions to strengthen their liquidity positions and fund 
their activities with more shareholder equity became popular following the 
2008 financial crisis.  In the context of shareholder equity, there were calls 
for raising the standards using one of the two defined capital requirement 
approaches—(a) the leverage ratio approach and (b) the risk based ap-
proach. These led eventually to the 2010 Basel III reforms, which focus on 
leverage ratio requirements259  and new standards for liquidity regulation.260 
Nevertheless, not all countries were eager to follow the new guidelines, and 
certain scholars, including Stanford professor Anat Admati, University of 
Bonn professor Martin Hellwig, and MIT professor Simon Johnson, who 
wrote extensively on these issues,261 joined other commentators in research 
promoting stricter capital requirements.262  Some higher capital require-
ments supporters found the Basel III leverage ratio to be too low for global 
SIFIs.263  Their advocating efforts resulted in several legislative and regula-
tory initiatives that have attempted to increase the minimum capital re-
quirements for banks. 
In summer 2013, Federal regulators unveiled a proposed Enhanced 
Supplementary Leverage Ratio rule,264 to increase the biggest banks’ and 
 
 258 Id. 
 259 Mayra Rodríguez Valladares, Why Basel’s Latest Leverage Ratio Is Better, AM. BANKER, (Jul. 
16, 2013, 3:28 PM), available at http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/why-basels-latest-
leverage-ratio-is-better-1060635-1.html.  Each of the two capital requirement approaches has limita-
tions. For example, leverage ratios create an incentive to take risks, while a risk based approach can of-
ten be gamed.  Id. 
 260 See generally Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: A global regulatory frame-
work for more resilient banks and banking systems, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (June 
2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf. 
 261 See generally ADMATI et al., supra note 238; Simon Johnson, The Impact of Higher Capital Re-
quirements for Banks, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2013, 5:00 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2013/04/18/the-impact-of-higher-capital-requirements-for-banks/; Simon Johnson, Low Bank Capital Is 
Next Fiscal Crisis, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Jul. 31, 2011, 8:30 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2011-08-01/low-bank-capital-is-the-next-u-s-fiscal-crisis-simon-johnson.html. 
 262 More recent studies that attempted to quantify the benefits and costs of capital requirements in-
clude P. Angelini, P. et al., Basel III: Long-term Impact on Economic Performance and Fluctuations 
(Bank for International Settlements Working Papers No. 338, Feb. 2011), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/work338.pdf; Basel Committee on Bank Supervision, An Assessment of the 
Long-Term Economic Impact of Stronger Capital and Liquidity Requirements, BANK FOR 
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (Aug. 2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs173.pdf; Samuel 
G. Hanson, Anil K Kashyap & Jeremy C. Stein et al., A Macro prudential Approach to Financial Regu-
lation, 25 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 3 (2011); and Anil Kashyap et al., An Analysis of the Impact of ‘Substan-
tially Heightened’ Capital Requirements on Large Financial Institutions, (unpublished manuscript) 
(May 2010), http://www.people.hbs.edu/shanson/Clearinghouse-paper-final_20100521.pdf. 
 263 Valladares, supra note 259. 
 264 See Press Release, FDIC, FDIC Board Approves Basel III Interim Final Rule and Supplementary 
Leverage Ratio Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FDIC (Jul. 9, 2013), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2013/pr13060.html. 




their bank holding subsidiaries’ leverage ratios to 5% and 6% respective-
ly.265  Similarly, a bill introduced by Senators Sherrod Brown and David 
Vitter also called for higher capital requirements, seeking to impose a 15% 
capital-to-assets ratio on all megabanks,266 a suggestion to which many ob-
jected.267  Indeed, for most banking institutions, a 15% capital-to-assets ra-
tio seems too high, but for TBTF banks a 15% capital-to-assets ratio is 
hardly adequate given the systemic repercussions that would follow the 
failure of such a megabank.268  But while no drastic changes have yet been 
made on the capital front, at least on the liquidity front changes were made, 
and on October 24, 2013, the Federal Reserve Board approved a rule re-
garding TBTF banks’ liquidity positions.269  This approved rule is stricter 
than the Basel Committee’s rule and would apply to a wide range of inter-
nationally active U.S. financial institutions. 
In Summer 2013, several months prior to this rule’s approval, the 
Bank of International Settlements also took steps to tighten capital and li-
quidity criteria when it released revisions to its Basel III leverage ratio 
framework and disclosure requirements.270  These revisions included new 
guidelines that require banks to calculate high quality capital—retained 
earnings and common equity—in a way that will cover not only on-balance 
sheet assets, but also a broad range of off-balance sheet instruments.  This 
method of calculation de facto requires banks to disclose publicly the dif-
ferent components included in their leverage ratio.271 
While it is very appealing to believe that by altering the capital and li-
 
 265 Id. 
 266 See Brown, supra note 99. 




 268 See generally Examining the GAO Report on Government Support for Bank Holding Companies: 
Hearing Before S. Comm. On Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. (2014), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg93180/pdf/CHRG-113shrg93180.pdf. 
 269 Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom, Federal Reserve Proposes Bank Liquidity Requirements 
That Exceed the Basel III Standard, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES 1 
(Oct. 24, 2013), available at http://www.skadden.com/newsletters/Federal_Reserve_Proposes_ 
Bank_Liquidity_Requirements_That_Exceed_the_Basel_III_Standard.pdf. 
 270 See Bank for International Settlements, Revised Basel III leverage ratio framework and disclo-
sure requirements - consultative document (June 2013) (unpublished document), available at http 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs251.pdf (the proposal details leverage ratio calculation framework, new 
disclosure requirements, and keeping an option open for higher leverage ratio than originally planned). 
 271 Id.  This change is meant to address the argument that “simply raising the leverage ratio won’t 
necessarily address all problems: What is in the numerator and the denominator makes all the difference.  
Banks attempt to get many different assets allowed in the numerator and as little covered in the denomi-
nator. Disclosure is key if there is any hope that the leverage ratio will have any credibility.” Mayra 
Rodríguez Valladares, Why Basel’s Latest Leverage Ratio Is Better, AM. BANKER (Jul. 16, 2013, 3:28 
PM), available at http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/why-basels-latest-leverage-ratio-is-better-
1060635-1.html. 
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quidity requirements we can end the TBTF problem,272 things are not that 
simple.  First, while many disagree with this theory, the megabanks and 
certain commentators argue that equity markets would not be able to pro-
vide the equity that would be required to comply with higher, more specific, 
capital requirements.273  Second, even with strict capital requirements and 
sanctions in place, it would be very difficult to get TBTF banks to value at 
less than $700 billion, which is the minimum bank’s total assets size that 
will be regulated under the new Federal proposed rule.274  This is because 
not only do banks have zero interest in getting below $700 billion, which 
would also take forever to accomplish organically, but because operational-
ly it will also be difficult to do, since asset sales of such scale will result in 
new or more TBTF bank and thus are unlikely to be approved by regula-
tors.275  Third, while TBTF banks will surely try to find ways around any 
liquidity or capital regulation imposed on them, in the meantime, the capital 
rules themselves are becoming impossible to understand.276  Fourth, the big 
 
 272 See J.V. Rizzi, Big Banks’ Warnings About Leverage Ratio Fail the Smell Test, AM. BANKER, 
(Jul. 17, 2013, 2:47 PM), available at http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/big-banks-warnings-
about-leverage-ratio-fail-the-smell-test-1060667-1.html (arguing that a new, higher leverage ratio is “a 
relatively modest proposal.  It can be easily addressed without material capital raises or changes in dis-
tribution policy for the few institutions that do not currently meet the requirements.”). 
 273 Citing Standard & Poor’s, Davis Polk said “banks would have to raise $1.2 trillion in additional 
equity to meet the Brown-Vitter requirements and that equity markets wouldn’t be able to provide that 
much.  It also stated that the proposed bill is not capable of distinguishing between risky and non-risky 
assets and could result in two banks with vastly different risk profiles holding exactly the same amount 
of capital.”  See Jesse Eisinger, In Brown-Vitter Banking Bill, a Banking Overhaul With Possible Teeth, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/in-brown-vitter-bill-a-
banking-overhaul-with-possible-teeth/?_r=0. The analysis said many banking groups would struggle to 
raise the common equity required by the bill and that the result would be asset sales, less lending and 
dilution of existing shareholders. Id. It also said Brown and Vitter failed to consider the effect of legal 
tools and requirements in the 2010 Dodd-Frank financial overhaul. Id. 
 274 According to the Federal regulator’s suggested July 2, 2013 proposal: 
“[u]nder the proposed rule, bank holding companies with more than $700 billion in consolidated total 
assets or $10 trillion in assets under custody (covered bank holding companies) would be required to 
maintain a tier 1 capital leverage buffer of at least 2 percent above the minimum supplementary leverage 
ratio requirement of 3 percent, for a total of 5 percent.  Failure to exceed the 5 percent ratio would sub-
ject covered BHCs to restrictions on discretionary bonus payments and capital distributions.  In addition 
to the leverage buffer for covered BHCs, the proposed rule would require insured depository institutions 
of covered BHCs to meet a 6 percent supplementary leverage ratio to be considered ‘well capitalized’ 
for prompt corrective action purposes. The proposed rule would currently apply to the eight largest, 
most systemically significant U.S. banking organizations.” 
See Ted Kaufman, Can Fed Withstand Pressure Of Banks To Weaken New Capital Requirements?, 
FORBES (Jul. 26, 2013, 9:30 AM), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/tedkaufman/2013/07/26/ 
can-fed-withstand-pressure-of-banks-to-weaken-new-capital-requirements/. 
 275 See, e.g., Barbara A. Rehm, An Alternative Plan to Fix TBTF: Lay Big Banks’ Subsidy Bare, AM. 
BANKER (Jul. 24, 2013, 2:14 PM), available at http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_142/an-
alternative-plan-to-fix-tbtf-lay-big-banks-subsidy-bare-1060847-1.html. 
 276 Id. (arguing that these rules include “a dozen separate ratios or surcharges and several different 
ways to calculate a capital ratio’s denominator. No one can even explain how the “new” leverage ratio 




banks argue that increasing capital requirement would reduce credit availa-
bility and encourage greater risk taking to restore earnings.277  And while 
commentators such as Carnegie Mellon University Professor Allan Meltzer 
argue that it is the Federal Reserve that determines the volume of lending, 
and that the banks that bear the cost of bad decisions rather than the pub-
lic,278 these arguments should still be carefully examined.  Finally, certain 
commentators argue that while lack of capital has not been a “key attribute” 
of historically failed banks,279 higher capital requirements will place U.S. 
banks at a competitive disadvantage to their foreign equals,280 adversely 
impact banks’ returns and lending abilities, and therefore negatively affect 
the entire U.S. economy.281 
 B. Shifting the Focus to the TBTF Creditors 
A second widely discussed suggestion to the TBTF problem focuses 
on SIFIs’ creditors,282 and proposes to make them take losses when SIFIs 
run into trouble.283  Arguably, this would make investors more likely to 
 
adopted [in summer 2013] relates to the old one.  And honestly no one knows how much capital is 
“enough.”); Barbara A. Rehm, How to Stop Banks from Gaming New Capital Rules, AM. BANKER (Aug. 
1, 2013, 3:19 PM), available at http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_148/how-to-stop-banks-
from-gaming-new-capital-rules-1061045-1.html (arguing that the capital rules are too complicated – just 
the latest Basel III rule alone is 971 pages – and this complication makes it easier for banks to manipu-
late the rule); Guillermo Ordoñez, Sustainable Shadow Banking 6 (NBER Working Paper No. 19022, 
2015), available at http://www.sas.upenn.edu/~ordonez/pdfs/Shadow.pdf (arguing that “banks can al-
ways find ways around regulation”); Jeff Cox, How Wall Street Will Beat the New Financial Regula-
tions, CNBC (Jul. 28, 2010, 10:15 AM), available at http://www.cnbc.com/id/38438525; Matt Levine, 
Who Would You Rather Trust: Bankers Or Regulators?, N.Y. TIMES, (May 7, 2013), available at 
http://dealbreaker.com/2013/05/who-would-you-rather-trust-bankers-or-regulators/ (“bankers, of course, 
always think that it would be efficient for them to find ways around regulation.”); Floyd Norris, After 
the Deal, the Focus Will Shift to Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept. 29, 2008), available at 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/09/29/after-the-deal-the-focus-will-shift-to-regulation (discussing 
“Wall Street’s finding ways around regulation by establishing new products.”). 
 277 See Examining the GAO Report on Government Support for Bank Holding Companies: Hearing 
Before S. Comm. On Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 124 (2014) (statement of Allan 
H. Meltzer, Professor of Political Economy, Carnegie Mellon University Tepper School of Business), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg93180/pdf/CHRG-113shrg93180.pdf. 
 278 Id. 
 279 Mark W. Olson, Banking Industry Overly Focused on Capital, AM. BANKER (Jul. 18, 2013, 1:45 
PM), available at http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/banking-industry-overly-focused-on-
capital-10607001.html (arguing that the ideal capital position is one that provides an appropriate buffer 
against losses, but also allows for an acceptable market return on the banks’ invested capital.). 
 280 J.V. Rizzi, supra note 272. 
 281 Id. 
 282 See generally Paul Melaschenko & Noel Reynolds, A Template for Recapitalising Too-Big-to-
Fail Banks, BIS Q. REV, June 2013, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1306e.pdf. 
 283 Jackson & Skeel, Jr. et al., supra note 43, at 437 (“bail-in is a form of administrative resolution, 
but it is designed to serve as a mid-course correction to preserve a troubled financial institution rather 
than as a full-blown, administrative resolution.  The most prominent proposals assume that regulators 
1PACKIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/29/15  1:35 PM 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 35:229 (2015) 
274 
weigh-up the likelihood of megabanks’ investments as such that are subject 
to mandatory write-down and expect returns commensurate with such risks, 
unlike now when investors lend to SIFIs expecting low risks because SIFIs 
can always be bailed-out.284  This notion has been advocated by U.S. gov-
ernment officials as one of the lessons learned from the 2008 financial cri-
sis.285  This type of a solution was also adopted in recent U.S. and EU bail-
in rules.286  The bail-in concept is partly based on empirical findings that 
equity and subordinated bondholders would have been the biggest losers 
from the €535 billion damage losses realized by failed European financial 
institutions.287  But such findings also show that losses attributed to senior 
debt holders would have been relatively insignificant, and that the deposi-
tors would have not been subject to losses at all.288 
There are several potential problems, however, with bail-ins, which 
shift the focus to the creditors and makes them take the losses.  First, using 
this method could result in banks increasing the interest rates they pay in 
order to raise the money they lend to customers, as bank investors would 
need to price in the risk of losing their money.289  Second, currently, little is 
 
will determine when to intervene, and would dictate which claims could be altered and which could 
not.”).  The structure of bail-ins differs from contingent capital liabilities, which provide for contingent 
conversion (CoCos) to equity in the case of failure.  Although a conversion trigger is required in both 
cases, CoCos are designed and purchased by investors on the basis of possible conversion from debt to 
equity, with maximum losses equivalent to the notional security face value.  A bail-in would result in 
mandatory conversion with the total write-down level that will be set by the level of the institution’s 
losses. See Conlona et al., supra note 43. 
 284 See Conlona et al., supra note 43. 
 285 See, e.g., Ian Katz, U.S. Treasury’s Miller Says Too-Big-To-Fail Bailouts Are Over, BLOOMBERG 
(Apr. 18, 2013, 7:30PM), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-18/u-s-treasury-s-
miller-says-too-big-to-fail-bailouts-are-over.html. In Spring 2013, U.S. Treasury Department official 
Mary Miller argued that “[a] common use of the too-big-to-fail shorthand is the notion that the govern-
ment will bail a company out if it is in danger of collapse because its failure would otherwise have too 
great a negative impact . . . With respect to this understanding of too-big-to-fail, let me be very clear: It 
is wrong . . . No financial institution, regardless of its size, will be bailed out by taxpayers again . . . 
Shareholders of failed companies will be wiped out; creditors will absorb losses; culpable management 
will not be retained and may have their compensation clawed back”. Id. 
 286 See, e.g., Jim Fuchs, From Bailouts to Bail-ins: Will the Single-Point-of-Entry Concept End 
“Too Big To Fail”?, CENT. BANKER, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS (Summer 2013), available 
at http://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/cb/articles/?id=2410 (meant to solve the TBTF problem, the 
new American “SPOE strategy is, in essence, a bail-in strategy because it implements a resolution pro-
cess that imposes losses on shareholders and unsecured creditors”); James Kanter & Jack Ewing, Eu-
rope’s Bank Deal Is Seen as Progress With Flaws, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2013, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/28/business/global/european-banking-deal-is-seen-as-progress-with-
flaws.html?_r=0 (“[t]he priority will be to make the creditors and owners responsible, and we get away 
from taxpayers always putting up for the banks.”); Melaschenko, supra note 282. . 
 287 See Conlona et al., supra note 43.  These EU bail-in rules are meant to be closely parallel to the 
FDIC’s single point of entry (SPOE) strategy in most respects, which is similar to bail-in, but has dis-
tinctive strengths and weaknesses, as further described below. 
 288 Id. 
 289 Id. 




known regarding the impact of bail-ins on the different liability holders.290  
The lack of objectivity on the trigger for bail-ins is problematic, as without 
unequivocal quantitative clarity on the trigger for creditor write-downs, in-
vestors may request a risk premium in compensation.291  Third, there is a 
significant time-consistency problem.  Regulators face a trade-off between 
placing losses on a small set of taxpayers today (bail-in) or spreading that 
risk across a much broader set of taxpayers today and tomorrow (bail-
out).292  A risk-averse, tax-smoothing administration may prefer the latter 
path, which historically has been the road taken during crises. Hypothetical-
ly, in a future crisis a government might choose the road not taken, but it 
appears that the financial markets are skeptical about such a possibility, de-
spite the Dodd-Frank Act’s language against bail-outs.  Thus, the time-
consistency dilemma, at perceived by the markets, is as acute as ever. 
Finally, the recent EU bail-in approach, and its parallel American 
SPOE approach have distinctive strengths and weaknesses.293  The SPOE, 
about which the FDIC has published a widely anticipated notice on Decem-
ber 18, 2013, deals with resolutions under the Orderly Liquidation Authori-
ty (OLA) contained in Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act.  In essence, OLA 
provides a back-up authority to place SIFIs into an FDIC receivership pro-
cess if there is no private sector option to prevent the SIFIs’ default and if 
the SIFIs’ resolution under the Bankruptcy Code would have a significant 
negative impact on the financial markets’ stability.  But this strategy is 
based on the fact that SIFIs are predominantly organized under a holding 
company structure with a top-tier parent holding company and operating 
subsidiaries.  And according to the SPOE strategy, upon a SIFI’s failure, 
the parent holding company would be put into an FDIC receivership with 
the SIFI’s bank, broker-dealer and other subsidiaries still being open for 
business.  During that time, the FDIC would organize a bridge financial en-
tity into which it would transfer the assets of the failed SIFI’s parent enti-
ty’s estate, including ownership interests in, and intercompany loans to, the 
 
 290 Id. 
 291 Id. 
 292 See Andrew G Haldane, Have We Solved ‘Too Big to Fail’?, VOX (Jan. 17, 2013), available at 
http://www.voxeu.org/article/have-we-solved-too-big-fail. 
 293 See generally Resolution of Systemically Import Financial Institutions: The Single Point of Entry 
Strategy, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,614, 76,614–76,624 (Dec. 18, 2013), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-12-18/pdf/2013-30057.pdf [hereinafter the “Notice”]; Bora 
Yagiz, Basel Paper Offers New Look At Bail-In Models For Ailing Institutions, REUTERS, June 12, 
2013, available at http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2013/06/12/basel-paper-offers-
new-look-at-bail-in-models-for-ailing-institutions/ (“this three-step model (recapitalization of the bank, 
transfer of losses to a holding company, and the sale of the bank) is a hybrid form of two resolution 
schemes. On the one hand, it has elements of a single point of entry, where a resolution authority would 
create a bridge holding company and allocate losses to shareholders and unsecured creditors through 
debt write-off . . .On the other hand, it resembles the bail-in scheme, where the funding comes from 
within and not from without.”). 
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subsidiaries.294  And while as part of the process, which the FDIC has 
viewed as a preferred resolution strategy, measures would be taken to ad-
dress the issues that led to the failure, I believe that significant challenges 
still remain.295 
First, although the SPOE strategy almost exclusively focuses on hold-
ing companies, it is unlikely that holding companies would be the direct 
source of financial distress, which would warrant the use of OLA.  And 
while resolving holding companies is much easier than resolving operating 
companies, in order for the SPOE strategy to provide a realistic roadmap to 
successfully solve the TBTF problem future crises, it must include a realis-
tic description of the process focusing on distress at the operating subsidi-
ary level.296  Second, it is not clear how the SPOE would handle a situation 
such as Lehman’s, where financial distress infects the entire family of enti-
ties, and it is difficult to determine which specific entity has failed.297  
Third, the SPOE suggests that distressed operating subsidiaries would be 
recapitalized by the forgiveness of intercompany debt owed to the holding 
company.  This means that sufficient intercompany debt is needed as well 
as capable executives that would know exactly when and where to direct it 
to, when cosigning the debt.  In addition, specifications on how to recapital-
ize such subsidiaries beyond the forgiveness of intercompany debt should 
also be carefully structured.  According to Seton Hall University professor 
Stephen Lubben, this might involve the controversial forming of a new, 
post-OLA intercompany debt funded by the parent entity’s own borrowing; 
and professor Lubben believes that this raises a legitimate concern that such 
lending could turn out to be a disguised bailout.  If one of the operating 
subsidiaries is insolvent its equity has no value, which can support a loan 
and that means that other operating subsidiaries with value would be need-
ed support a secured loan, but it is not clear what would happen if there was 
not enough value to support liquidity needs.298  Fourth, the SPOE strategy 
chooses to ignore the existence of situations in which it would make more 
sense to have the OLA administration impact more than just a holding 
company and subject an operating subsidiary to receivership proceedings, 
and even liquidate it if needed, rather than endanger the entire family’s 
 
 294 Id. The Dodd-Frank Act authorizes the FDIC to establish a “bridge financial company” to tempo-
rarily succeed to selected assets and liabilities of the SIFI. 12 U.S.C. § 5390(h) (2014). 
 295 In May 2012, FDIC Chairman indicated that SPOE is the FDIC’s preferred resolution strategy 
under OLA. See Martin J. Gruenberg Acting Chairman, FDIC, Remarks to the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago Bank Structure Conference (May 10, 2012), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/ 
speeches/chairman/spmay1012.html. 
 296 Stephen J. Lubben, Thoughts on Single Point of Entry, comment letter submitted to the FDIC in 
response to their Single Point of Entry (SPOE) Strategy for implementing Dodd Frank’s Orderly Liqui-
dation Authority (Federal Register/Vol. 78, No. 243), (Feb. 7, 2014), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2392450. 
 297 Id. 
 298 Id. 




functioning.299  Fifth, the SPOE supports the concept of a sale rather than 
capitalization of material SIFI’s assets, but it may be tricky to find acquirers 
with the desire and financial ability to make the acquisition even if the 
regulators were willing to permit it.300  Sixth, although the SPOE strategy 
eliminates some of the other strategies’ concerns, such as long proceedings 
that result in the loss of going concern value for creditors, and the loss of 
critical services provided by the SIFI, it could be impaired by potential 
ring-fencing by non-U.S. authorities that have jurisdiction over SIFIs’ or 
their assets.301  And while the FDIC attempts to address this international 
risk by suggesting a multiple point of entry (MPOE) approach, it is not al-
ways easy to identify in advance which strategy is preferred–SPOE or 
MPOE–as the successful implementation of a chosen strategy will depend 
on a range of considerations.  Additionally, even if an MPOE strategy is 
adopted, the FDIC is likely to encounter serious implementation problems 
due to the difficulties of cross-border cooperation, and inconsistencies 
might undermine the approach’s effectiveness.302  Finally, since OLA is 
meant to “backstop” the normal bankruptcy process, regulators still need to 
improve Chapter 11’s ability of to handle large financial institutions.303 
 C. Activities and Size Restrictions 
A third potential line of solutions attempts to restrict banks’ activities, 
size, or both, in order to reduce the risks they pose to the financial sys-
tem.304 
 1. Big Banks’ Activities 
Limiting banks’ activities mainly means restricting non-traditional 
banking activities.  This is the aim of the Volcker rule, which is meant to 
affect how megabanks do business—and the danger that their trading bets 
 
 299 Id. (note, however, that on page 76,623 of the proposal, the FDIC does discuss the possibility of 
needing to place subsidiaries in receivership proceedings and exposing them and their stakeholders to 
losses, but as noted by professor Lubben, this seems to undermine parts of the SPOE strategy.). 
 300 See FDIC Board Releases Single Point of Entry Resolution Strategy for Public Comment, 
Shearman & Sterling LLP (Dec. 20, 2013), available at http://www.shearman.com/en/newsinsights/ 
publications/2013/12/fdic-releases-single-point-of-entry-resolution. 
 301 Id. 
 302 “The F.D.I.C. has received an expression of potential cooperation from the Bank of England. 
Unfortunately, this and other vague statements are unlikely to hold up under the pressure of many real 
world situations. Only a binding treaty on cross-border resolution could really make a difference and 
this is unlikely for the foreseeable future.” See Financial Services Forum, supra note 135. 
 303 See generally Stephen J. Lubben, OLA after Single Point of Entry: Has Anything Changed? (Se-
ton Hall Univ. Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 2353035, 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2353035. 
 304 See Barth et al., supra note 45. 
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could implode at taxpayers’ expense.305  Similarly, regulation initiatives fol-
lowing the principle have recently been considered abroad too, and include 
the Vickers Commission proposal in the U.K., the Liikanen Report to the 
European Commission, and draft legislation in France and Germany, all of 
which attempt to eliminate implicit TBTF subsidies, by suggesting a man-
datory separation of commercial banking from securities markets activi-
ties.306  Such a limitation addresses the negative incentive that the mega-
banks have to take excessive risks.  This incentive is the result of the 
government’s safety net supporting types of activities that go far beyond the 
core traditional banking that is necessary for the government to protect.307  
And since traditional megabanks’ activities provide external social benefits, 
which arguably justify granting them support, the megabanks have been re-
ceiving this support and subsidies as a whole, with no limitations to the 
specific activities for which the support is intended.308 
Also aiming to restrict some of the dangerous megabanks’ activities, 
Sen. Elizabeth Warren introduced a proposal to, de facto, repeal large parts 
of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which was passed in 1999, and undid the 
historic Glass-Steagall Act’s prohibition on combining banking and com-
mercial activity.  Many commentators view departures from Glass-
Steagall’s prohibition as the root cause of the 2008 crisis, because it ena-
bled megabanks to get involved in riskier operations and activities.  Warren 
has proposed a modern Glass-Steagall Act that would force the megabanks 
to divest themselves of business lines engaged in non-banking activi-
 
 305 The initial version of the Volcker rule stated that “because bank deposits are federally guaran-
teed, deposit-taking banks should be restricted from making risky investments . . . [and] [t]he substance 
of the Volcker Rule was implemented by the Dodd-Frank. . . [which] prohibits banks from “1) engaging 
in proprietary trading” or “2) acquir[ing] or retain[ing] any equity, partnership, or other ownership inter-
est in or sponsor[ing] a hedge fund or a private equity fund.” See Steven L. Schwarcz, Ring-Fencing, 87 
S. CAL. L. REV 69, 80 (2013). 
 306 See Leonardo Gambacorta & Adrian van Rixtel, Structural Bank Regulation Initiatives: Ap-
proaches and Implications 1–3, 9 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Papers No. 412, 2013), available 
at http://www.bis.org/publ/work412.pdf.  Specifically, on Jan. 29, 2014, the EU Commission published 
a proposal regarding a regulation on structural reform of the EU banking sector. Id. Recognizing that 
“too-big-to-fail” banks still exist, and trying to “refocus. . .banks on their core relationship-oriented role 
of serving the real economy,” the regulation will (i) “[b]an proprietary trading in financial instruments 
and commodities;” (ii) “[g]rant supervisors the power and. . . obligation to require the transfer of other 
high-risk trading activities . . . to separate legal trading entities within the group;” and (iii) “[p]rovide 
rules on the economic, legal, governance, and operational links between the separated trading entity and 
the rest.” See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Structural 
Measures Improving the Resilience of EU Credit Institutions, COM (2014) 43 final, at 15 (Jan. 29, 
2014), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014PC0043 
&from=EN. 
 307 See generally Thomas M. Hoenig & Charles S. Morris, Restructuring the Banking System to Im-
prove Safety and Soundness, FDIC (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/ 
board/Restructuring-the-Banking-System-05-24-11.pdf. 
 308 Id. at 3–4. 




ties.309And while the debate continues on whether to put limits on banks’ 
activities and thus affect future banking and merger undertakings, commen-
tators find it difficult to evaluate the cost-benefit ratio, mainly because there 
is little evidence on either side.310 
However, even without fully analyzing the consequences of limiting 
banks’ activities, commentators agree on a few points about the conse-
quences of limiting or not limiting banks’ activities.  First, not limiting 
banks’ activities can positively and negatively impact banks’ functioning.311  
Banks that are not limited to certain activities can increase the diversifica-
tion of their assets and revenue streams and reduce their risks by getting in-
volved in additional undertakings. But, banks’ riskiness can also greatly in-
crease their risks if they engage in additional activities that make it difficult 
to evaluate, monitor, and contain the excessive risk-taking incentivized by 
the safety net.312 Second, there are costs to be expected in terms of reduced 
liquidity and increased transactions costs, which mean that there will be 
“less investment, economic growth, and job-creation.”313  Third, while there 
is no proof that limiting banks’ activities will result in a simpler and more 
readily regulated financial system, there is no proof for this.314 
 2. Big Banks’ Size 
Breaking-up the biggest banks up to reduce risks of a future crisis is a 
popular suggestion that appeals to base instincts.315  And while there are 
less draconian measures than breaking-up the banks that have not been 
tried, and might work,316 Many argue that breaking-up banks is the most ef-
 
 309 See Press Release, Senators Warren, McCain, Cantwell, and King Introduce 21st Century Glass-
Steagall Act (Jul. 11, 2013), http://www.warren.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=178; U.S. Senator for 
Mass. Elizabeth Warren, Fact Sheet (Jul. 11, 2013), http://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/Fact 
Sheet - 21st Century Glass-Steagall.pdf 
 310 See Barth, supra note 44. 
 311 Id. 
 312 Id. 
 313 Id. at 31. 
 314 Id. 
 315 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure is an Option: An Ersatz-Antitrust 
Approach to Financial Regulation, 120 YALE LAW L.J.JOURNAL, 1368, 1376 (2011); Travis Waldron, 
Democratic Senator Renews Call To Break Up Banks That Are ‘Surely Still Too Big To Fail’, THINK 
PROGRESS (Feb. 28, 2013, 6:00PM) available at http://thinkprogress.org/economy/ 
2013/02/28/1655351/sherrod-brown-break-up-banks/ (arguing that “[t]wo decades ago, the six largest 
Wall Street banks held assets worth just 16 percent of the American economy. . . They now hold assets 
worth more than 60 percent of the total economy”). 
 316 See, e.g., David A. Skeel Jr., A Better Way to End ‘Too Big To Fail’, Let the Giant Banks Them-
selves Choose How to Downsize Their Institutions, WALL ST. J. (June 3, 2013, 6:45 PM), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323744604578473311486924532 (suggesting com-
bining two approaches—capital levels and size limitations); Barbara A. Rehm, Fed’s Dudley: Use De-
ferred Comp to Bolster Capital in Tough Times, AM. BANKER (Nov. 8, 2013, 4:56 PM), available at 
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fective way to deal with the TBTF problem.317 Moreover, recent banking 
scandals also demonstrate the difficulties associated with properly govern-
ing various activities and controlling the megabanks.318  Therefore, alt-
hough the interconnectedness in, and the fragility of the banking system do 
need to be addressed separately by some of the measures mentioned in this 
article—including increasing equity levels—attempting to fix the TBTF 
problem using only such measures might not be enough. Restructuring the 
TBTF banks might still be desired because unlike with small banks, letting 
a big and complex bank fail is not a real option, and threatening to let such 
a bank go down when there is a crisis is not a credible threat.319  According-
ly, even the Dodd-Frank Act mandates that when regulators are unsatisfied 
with SIFIs’ re-submitted living will plans the government can break-up the 
megabanks that submitted the lacking plans.320 
The proposal to break-up big banks presents several problems.  First, a 
practical issue is how to calculate an appropriate size limit is difficult.  Re-
cent studies on the connection between financial depth and growth shed 
some light on this issue, and suggest that there is a threshold at which the 
private-credit-to-GDP ratio may start to negatively impact GDP and 
productivity growth.321 
Second, a pending empirical issue is if size limits would erode the 
economies of scale and scope, which might otherwise be highly associated 
and affiliated with big banks. The existing literature on these economies of 
scale has, until recently, indicated they may be exhausted at relatively low 
balance sheet thresholds.  A number of new studies, however, seem to sug-
gest differently suggest with economies of scale found for banks with bal-
ance sheets above $1 trillion.322  Nevertheless, no clear conclusions can be 
 
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/feds-dudley-use-deferred-comp-to-bolster-capital-in-tough-
times-10635291.html (Federal Reserve Bank of New York President William Dudley suggested to 
“structure compensation practices to strengthen senior bank managers’ incentives to proactively manage 
risk,” by withholding executive compensation to cover capital losses). 
 317 See, e.g., Skeel, Rehm, supra note 316. 
 318 See generally Nizan Geslevich Packin, It’s (Not) All About the Money: Using Behavioral Eco-
nomics to Improve Regulation of Risk Management in Financial Institutions, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 419 
(2013). 
 319 Simon Johnson, The Bankruptcy Exemption, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2013), available at 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/07/the-bankruptcy-exemption/ (“[B]ankruptcy cannot work 
for large, complex financial institutions in the United States, at least not using the current bankruptcy 
code.”). 
 320 See generally Packin, supra note 10. 
 321 See, e.g., Jean-Louis Arcand, Enrico Berkes & Ugo Panizza, Too Much Finance? (IMF Working 
Paper WP 12/161, 2012), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12161.pdf; Ste-
phen Cecchetti & Enisse Kharroubi, Reassessing the Impact of Finance on Growth (Bank for Int’l Set-
tlements Working Papers 381, 2012), available at www.bis.org/publ/work381.pdf. 
 322 See, e.g., Guohua Feng & Apostolos Serletis, Efficiency, Technical Change, and Returns to Scale 
in Large US Banks: Panel Data Evidence from an Output Distance Function Satisfying Theoretical 
Regularity, (2009) 34 J. OF BANKING & FIN. 1, 127–38; (2009); David Wheelock & Paul Wilson, Do 




made yet, especially because the implicit subsidy might be what could show 
up as economies of scale.  Indeed, a recent study of by the Bank of England 
research has showed that, once those subsidies are accounted for, evidence 
of scale economies typically disappears for banks with assets in excess of 
$100 .323  Moreover, there may even be evidence of scale diseconomies, of-
ten referred to as megabanks being “too-big-to-manage.” 
Third, megabanks offer their customers products, services, and infra-
structure that smaller banks cannot match, from multicity branch networks 
to global coverage at a consistent cost.324  According to certain commenta-
tors, such as University of Maryland professor Phillip Swagel, the global 
transaction services that megabanks provide simply could not be recreated 
as efficiently or as cheaply by smaller banks, or even a patchwork of small-
er banks.325  Accordingly, it might be difficult to break-up megabanks, 
without sacrificing the their product diversity, large scale, and international 
reach,326 or without forcing individual customers into the arms of payday 
lenders and other, presumably less-scrupulous, non-bank financial services 
providers.327 
Fourth, certain commentators believe that “[b]oth the legislation and 
the rules designed to make banks smaller are jeopardizing our standing in 
the world and our ability to compete.”328  They argued that if unchecked, 
regulators pushing to break-up big U.S. banks could result in much “busi-
ness migrating to non-U.S. banks and the less-regulated shadow banking 
sector,”, which will diminish the role of the U.S. as a significant political 
and economic superpower.329 
Fifth, it is not clear if whether the megabanks really do pose such a 
great danger to the economy post-2008 crisis.  Unlike in other countries, the 
 
Large Banks have Lower Costs? New Estimates of Returns to Scale for U.S. Banks, (2012) 44 J. OF 
MONEY, CREDIT, AND BANKING 1, 171–199, (2012). 
 323 Davies & Tracey, supra note 158. 
 324 Phillip Swagel, Don’t Make Banks Too Small to Succeed, BLOOMBERG (Sep. 5, 2012, 6:30 PM), availa-
ble at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-05/don-t-make-banks-too-small-to-succeed.html 
(“Philadelphia-based chemical company FMC Corp. (FMC), for example, relies on large banks to fund 
its $1.5 billion revolving credit line and to offer worldwide support for its financing needs.”). 
 325 Id.; Mark Roe, London Whale is the Cost of Too Big to Fail, The Harvard Law School Forum on 
Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (Mar. 25, 2013 9:28 AM), available at 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/03/25/london-whale-is-the-cost-of-too-big-to-fail/ (“If the 
banking conglomerates were carved up into their constituent parts, the individual units would have a 
much higher cost of capital.”). 
 326 Charles W. Calomiris, Debate: Should Big Banks be Broken Up?, ECONOMIST (May 14, 2013), 
available at http://www.economist.com/debate/days/view/977. 
 327 See generally RICHARD X. BOVE, GUARDIANS OF PROSPERITY: WHY AMERICA NEEDS BIG 
BANKS (2013). 
 328 Maria Aspan, Analyst Dick Bove Defends Big Banks, Slams Regulators (Jan. 9, 2014, 2:19 PM), 
http://www.americanbanker.com/people/analyst-dick-bove-defends-big-banks-slams-regulators-
1064796-1.html. 
 329 See Swagel, supra note  325. 
1PACKIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/29/15  1:35 PM 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 35:229 (2015) 
282 
U.S. financial system is small relatively to the economy it supports., and  
“[A]ccording to the Federal Reserve, the assets of the top five U.S. banks 
equal 56% of gross domestic product.”330  Differently, for example, “the 
five largest German banks have assets that total 116% percent of GDP and 
in the U.K., the top five are at 309% of GDP.”331  In addition, in the U.S., 
growth in the U.S. formal banking sector over the last two decades has 
“lagged behind the increase in American exports and the gain in the Stand-
ard & Poor’s 500 stock index over the same period.”332 
Finally, when one contemplates how the government would break -up 
megabanks and how disruptive such break-ups would be to the economy, 
this proposal seems daunting, especially when considered in the context of 
the typical political horse-trading culture. 
 D. Reducing Economy’s Exposure – The Dallas Fed Plan 
The Dallas Fed plan,333 which was created with the goal of reducing 
the economy’s exposure to the big banks, includes three main elements.  
First, it would explicitly restrict the government’s “guarantee” to bank de-
posits already protected by the FDIC and would prevent any access by the 
non-depository parts and constituents of the megabanks from accessing to 
Federal Reserve loans.  Second, it would mandate that each corporation, en-
tity, or individual that does business with a big bank sign a statement de-
claring that they acknowledge that there is no federal guarantee.  Third, it 
would require government regulators to strategize and create incentives for 
banks to streamline, simplify, and downsize their operations and subsidiar-
ies so that banking affiliates of the financial holding company would be 
FDIC-certified as “too-small-to-save” in the event of failure.334 
The main advantages of the Dallas Fed plan are that these three steps 
would help realign incentives away from the current perverse TBTF banks 
mindset and would re-establish a more competitive framework within the 
financial sector.  In addition, operationally, the Dallas Fed plan could be 
thought of as a plan to mitigate moral hazard.  Nevertheless, it is unlikely 
that even if adopted as is the Dallas Fed plan, even if adopted as is, would 
be able to put an end to banking and financial crises.  Indeed, despite the 
advantages of this plan, certain commentators have expressed a fear that in 
the event of a future crisis, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Depart-
 
 330 Id. 
 331 Id. 
 332 Id. 
 333 See Correcting ‘Dodd–Frank’ to Actually End ‘Too Big to Fail’: Hearing Examining How the 
Dodd–Frank Act Could Result in More Taxpayer-Funded Bailouts Before H. Comm. on Fin. Services, 
113th Cong. 11 (2013) (statement of Richard Fisher, President and CEO, Federal Reserve Bank of Dal-
las), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg81769/pdf/CHRG-113hhrg81769.pdf. 
 334 Id. 




ment would still be required to intervene and protect the megabanks in the 
event of a future crisis, because the objective of the 2008 bailouts was to 
prevent a broad economic meltdown, rather than to protect depositors and 
counterparties.335 
 E. A Subsidy Reserve Fund 
A potential solution that Congressman Michael Capuano recently in-
troduced relies on market discipline.336  The legislation, which was engi-
neered by Boston University professor Cornelius Hurley and former FDIC 
Chairman William Isaac, attempts to require SIFIs to set aside balance sheet 
reserves equal to the net advantage that they get for being SIFIs.337 
Balance sheet reserves are accounting entries that reflect money a 
business entity sets aside in order to pay future obligations, and are there-
fore recorded as liabilities.  In Congressman Capuano’s proposal, this 
means that each big bank would be required to establish a “subsidy reserve” 
line item on its balance sheet and add to it every year the estimated subsidy 
it receives from taxpayers in the form of reduced funding costs.  According 
to the proposal, the subsidy reserve would be calculated based on the “sup-
port” versus “stand-alone” ratings currently assigned by credit-rating agen-
cies.  Specifically, the Federal Reserve, cooperating with the Financial Sta-
bility Oversight Council’s Office of Financial Research, would work to 
“establish a formula for determining the financial benefit” that big firms re-
ceive when “shareholders, creditors, and counterparties” believe that the 
government “will shield them from losses in the event of failure.”338  This is 
because the amount set aside reflects an earning that the financial institution 
did not earn.  Thus, such reserves would be treated as capital for liquidation 
purposes but not for regulatory purposes, and would not count towards reg-
ulatory capital requirements or be used to pay executives, buy-back shares, 
or give dividends.339 
According to the proposal, the reserve would accrue year after year 
and could be distributed to the megabanks’ shareholders only in proportion 
to a bank’s shrinkage via asset sales, or divestitures or spin-offs of assets.  
As the megabanks downsize, however, the pro-rata portion of the reserve 
fund is to be allocated to the divested assets.340  The only way megabanks 
 
 335 Garver, supra note 167. 
 336 Subsidy Reserve Act of 2013, H.R. 2266, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 337 See, e.g., Barbara A. Rehm, An Alternative Plan to Fix TBTF: Lay Big Banks’ Subsidy Bare, AM. 
BANKER, (Jul. 24, 2013, 2:14PM), available at http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_142/an-
alternative-plan-to-fix-tbtf-lay-big-banks-subsidy-bare-1060847-1.html. 
 338 Id. 
 339 Id. 
 340 Garver, supra note 167. 
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could monetize their reserves is by divesting themselves.341 
The best aspect of the proposal is that it is self-policing.  As the re-
serve builds up, combined with higher capital and liquidity requirements 
imposed by regulators, shareholders will be more likely to demand that the 
reserves be used more efficiently.  Accordingly, managers and boards of 
directors of big banks faced with such shareholders’ demands will find 
themselves needing to choose between: (i) continuing to do business as 
usual, in which case, the subsidy reserve and the capital will increase to the 
point at which the big banks become too-safe-to-fail342 or (ii) becoming 
smaller by getting rid of some of their less profitable operations, selling 
subsidiaries, or spinning-off divisions to shareholders.343  Hurley and Isaac 
believe that in a short time, shareholders are likely to apply pressure on the 
megabanks receiving the subsidies to become smaller financial institutions.  
This incentive will make the megabanks want to downsize and divest 
enough, to reach the point at which they no longer receive the subsidy.  As 
a result, megabanks will be less dangerous and not required to maintain 
subsidy reserves.344 
 
This proposal: (i) can be readily adopted on a global basis; (ii) relies on 
self-policing and market discipline, which are key in market-driven econo-
my, as opposed to arbitrary break-up plans and caps on growth; (iii) helps 
to get incentives right (at least those valued by the Dallas Fed’s plan); and 
(iv) has the additional benefit of enforceability due to its transparency and 
simplicity.  Nonetheless, there are several problems with the proposal.  
First, and most importantly, there likely will be an intense debate to deter-
mine the acceptable methodology for measuring the TBTF subsidy for the 
purpose of contributing to the reserve fund.  Indeed, it is not clear how the 
Federal Reserve and Financial Stability Oversight Council’s Office of Fi-
nancial Research would calculate and determine the subsidy amount.  As 
described in this article, there are very different methods to measure any 
TBTF subsidies.  Accordingly, estimates done by the Bank for International 
Settlements, the International Monetary Fund, and certain academics came 
in between $50 billion and $100 billion per year,345 while some commenta-
 
 341 William Isaac & Cornelius Hurley, At last—How America Can Solve the ‘too big to fail’ Prob-
lem, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2013 6:46PM), available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c87f342e-5fda-11e2-
8d8d-00144feab49a.html#axzz2qqt2oXnN. 
 342 This option will be favorable to taxpayers and regulators, but will result in lower returns on 
shareholders’ investment. 
 343 Pursuant to this option, portions of the subsidy reserve will be allocated to the divested entities. 
 344 See Rehm, supra note 316 (“It will not take long for recalcitrant managers to be challenged by 
their shareholders demanding the release of this capital through the rightsizing of the institution . . . it is 
market discipline, not regulators or politicians, making this happen.  All this can be accomplished simp-
ly by shifting our focus away from arbitrary capital levels and toward the taxpayer subsidy of the 
TBTFs.”). 
 345 Garver, supra note 167. 




tors and big banks deny the existence of any subsidies altogether.346  Se-
cond, despite the “win-win” rhetoric surrounding this proposal’s two op-
tions and its self-regulating element, it is not clear why the megabanks’ 
shareholders would be so eager to influence SIFIs in an attempt to make 
them smaller and riskier when they could just invest in other avenues that 
reflect their interests better.  Third, it is not clear how the reserve model 
could achieve better results than other proposals such as additional capital 
or forced divestitures that force the shrinkage of megabanks.  Fourth, it is 
unclear how easy it would be for the regulators to enforce this proposal and 
penalize or impose sanctions against those that do not comply.  For exam-
ple, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which insures deposits up 
to $250,000, failed to collect insurance premiums from most big banks 
from 1996 to 2006, and tried for years to get congressional authority to col-
lect the premiums in case of a looming crisis.347  Finally, given that balance 
sheet reserves are recorded as liabilities, which reflect money a business en-
tity sets aside in order to pay future obligations, it should be made clear 
who whether the big banks would owe their reserve funds to the govern-
ment, the taxpayers, or perhaps a different party.  Insurance companies, for 
example, set-up balance sheet reserves to ensure they have enough funds set 
aside to pay-out claims.  Thus, their reserves often equal the value of claims 
that have been filed against the insurance companies, but not paid out yet. 
 V. TRYING SOMETHING DIFFERENT? USING USER-FEES TO 
ADDRESS TBTF 
 A. Introducing the Concept of User-Fees 
Each of the approaches described is useful and necessary but it is 
doubtful that one approach would prove sufficient to tackle the TBTF prob-
lem.  Accordingly, there is room for an additional proposal, which can and 
should be used together with other approaches, and is based on requiring 
TBTF banks to pay user-fees.  User-fees are prices a governmental agency 
charges for a service or product whose distribution it controls.348  User-fees 
link cost to benefit.  Those who use the service pay for it and those who do 
 
 346 See, e.g., STOGIN supra note 13; Policy Brief supra note 13. 
 347 See, e.g., Julie Crawshaw, FDIC Failed to Collect Premiums for Years, MONEYNEWS (Mar. 16, 
2009, 02:54PM), available at http://www.moneynews.com/StreetTalk/bair-fdic-premiums/ 
2009/03/16/id/328841. 
 348 “Recently, the federal government has developed substantial interest in financing through user 
fees a variety of the services it provides.”  Clayton P. Gillette & Thomas D. Hopkins, Federal User 
Fees: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 67 B.U. L. REV. 795, 796 (1987) (“Recently, the federal gov-
ernment has developed substantial interest in financing through user fees a variety of the services it pro-
vides.”). 
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not use the service are not forced to pay for it.349  Therefore, user-fees are 
not as coercive as most other forms of taxation, which require mandatory 
payments.350 
User-fee models are not new.  For example, in 1992, the Prescription 
Drug User Fee Acts made the FDA dependent on funding from pharmaceu-
tical firms, while deepening the FDA’s regulatory capture.  Congress 
adopted that legislation, which might have enabled an enhancement of the 
FDA’s supervision powers with more review staff351 that could quickly and 
proficiently examine applications to market new drugs.  Congress did so af-
ter the FDA came under criticism for taking too long to rule on new-drug 
applications, and mainly for enabling consumers to purchase and use insuf-
ficiently tested drugs, which proved to have risky side effects that were un-
discovered until the drugs were in general use.352  To address these systemic 
problems, the FDA used the user-fees to increase the volume and depth of 
its work, examining the products of the industry’s participants.353 
As demonstrated in the FDA example, another important advantage of 
user-fees is that they shift large parts of the cost of regulation to the indus-
try’s participants that need to be supervised by a regulating agency.354  This 
burden-shifting and the less coercive elements of user-fees in comparison to 
traditional taxes are the main reasons that the user-fees are becoming in-
creasingly popular as a solution when enhanced regulatory supervision of a 
certain industry is needed.355  A recent illustration of this growing populari-
 
 349 Robert W. McGee, Taxation and Public Finance: A Philosophical and Ethical Approach, 1 
Commentaries on the Law of Accounting & Finance 157, (1997), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=461340 (discusses the pros and cons of the various 
forms of taxation including user-fees). 
 350 Id. 
 351 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 379g-h (2000); Eric R. Claeys, The Food and Drug Administration and the 
Command-and-Control Model of Regulation, 49 ST LOUIS U. L.J. 105, 129, (2004). 
 352 See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/PEMD-96-1, FDA DRUG APPROVAL: 
REVIEW TIME HAS DECREASED IN RECENT YEARS (1995); Richard Dorsey, The Case for Deregulating 
Drug Efficacy, 242 AM. MED. ASSOC. 1755 (1979); Mary K. Olson, Regulatory Agency Discretion 
among Competing Industries: Inside the FDA, 11 J.L. Econ. & Org. 379 (1995). 
 353 Marc A. Rodwin, Institutional Corruption and the Pharmaceutical Policy, 41 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 544, 546 (2013). 
 354 Patrick O’Leary, Funding the FDA: Assessing the User Fee Provisions of the FDA Safety and 
Innovation Act of 2012, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 239, 249 (2013); DIV. OF INV. MGMT., U.S. SEC. AND 
EXCHANGE COMM’N, STUDY ON ENHANCING INVESTMENT ADVISER EXAMINATIONS 25–29 (2011) 
[hereinafter SEC Staff Study], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/914studyfinal.pdf.  
“User fees are a vital part of the FDA’s mission today.  They accounted for thirty-five percent of the 
agency’s total budget in FY 2012 and under President Obama’s FY 2013 proposed budget over $1.9 
billion in fees would account for forty-four percent of the agency’s budget and pay for over 4,700 full-
time equivalent employees.” Id. 
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example, user fees fund inspections of banks conducted by the Office of Comptroller of the Currency, 
examinations of credit unions by the National Credit Union Administration, inspections of nuclear fa-
cilities by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, inspections of national marine fisheries by the National 




ty is the SEC’s recommendation, under the direction of Section 914 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, which required the SEC to study options for overseeing 
broker-dealers and investment advisers, to consider imposing user-fees on 
SEC-registered investment advisers.356 
 B. User-Fees and Big Banks 
While there have been many attempts to create rules on an adequate 
resolution authority to address failing SIFIs, this objective has not yet been 
achieved.  Nevertheless, in order to better monitor and grasp the levels of 
risks taken by SIFIs and assess the scope of the implicit benefits they re-
ceive, and how they impact the financial markets, imposing user-fees on 
SIFIs to fund an appropriate overseeing body’s efforts to do exactly that, 
could be very efficient.  In addition, as further detailed below, I believe 
such an approach can help shift some of the burden to reduce the subsidies 
to the biggest banks themselves. 
For this article’s purpose I would assume that the appropriate oversee-
ing body could be the Financial Stability Oversight Council (the “Coun-
cil”).  The Council could charge user-fees for government guarantees, ef-
fectively transforming implicit guarantees into explicit ones.357  The 
Council would then use the fees collected for the following three purposes.  
First, although the user-fees are not meant to be high enough to fully offset 
the TBTF subsidies, the Council could use parts of the banks’ fees as con-
tributions toward a resolution fund, to which a certain portion of the fees 
would be added annually to offset part of the implicit subsidies.  Arguably, 
having such a fund available, even if it is very partial, increases the willing-
ness of authorities to engage in resolution, in turn, reducing the likelihood 
of bailout.  Second, the Council could enhance its SIFIs’ supervision, which 
might only have a limited effect on the implicit subsidy, or on the TBTF 
problem, but would nonetheless directly reduce the probability of distress.  
Third, relatedly, the user-fees could help enhance transparency and disclo-
sure requirements, which would ideally help reduce unnecessary bailouts.  
Specifically, the Council could monitor the extent of the various explicit 
and implicit subsidies provided to each SIFI and conduct special examina-
 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and quality examinations of agricultural commodities and 
processing plants by the Department of Agriculture.” SEC Staff Study, supra note 354, at 25–26. 
 356 See Clifford J. Alexander & Arthur C. Delibert, SEC Recommends ‘User Fees’ or SRO Model to 
Facilitate Compliance Examinations, MONEY MANAGER’S COMPLIANCE GUIDE, Feb. 2011, at ¶110 
(noting the SEC liked the user fees options because registered investment advisers currently bear little of 
the cost of their regulatory oversight as compared to other groups of participants in the financial services 
markets). 
 357 See Sebastian Schich & Sofia Lindh, Implicit Guarantees for Bank Debt: Where Do We Stand?, 
1 OECD J. FIN. MKT. TRENDS 15 (2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/finance/financial-
markets/Implicit-Guarantees-for-bank-debt.pdf. 
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tion of their books, records and activities, that would be designed to: (i) im-
prove compliance with any subsidies’ guidelines; (ii) prevent fraud using 
the subsidies’ guidelines, or relying on the safety net; (iii) monitor risk re-
sulting from the SIFIs’ operations and reliance on the subsidies; and (iv) in-
form regulatory policy concerning the subsidies.  Such examinations should 
include making sure that there is minimal inappropriate transfer of federal 
subsidies from institutions that benefit from government subsidies to un-
regulated entities.  Additionally, the user-fees could provide the Council 
with the resources to perform earlier examinations of potentially problemat-
ic issues related to the subsidies, and their impact on the various banks’ 
profitability, business models, and strategies.  User-fee funds would also 
enable more frequent examinations of the various explicit and implicit sub-
sidies given to each SIFI, and that examinations might provide a greater 
level of deterrence of wrongdoing, as banks would acknowledge that they 
are subject to frequent examinations.  Moreover, frequent examinations of 
SIFIs could help address various issues at earlier stages and, in some cases, 
limit the amount of losses and obstruction to the financial markets. 
Under this approach, the Council would continue to rely on appropri-
ated funds to support its other programs, but the user-fees collected from 
the various SIFIs would be available to the Council without further appro-
priation, used solely to fund the Council’s TBTF subsidies examination 
program, and set at a level designed to achieve an acceptable frequency of 
examinations.  User-fees also could provide resources that would permit the 
Council to improve and upgrade the efficiency and success of its examina-
tions by using long-term strategic planning that would enable the Council to 
better utilize both technology and its workforce.358  Training its staff and 
financially investing in better technology could assist the Council to better 
understand and evaluate increasingly sophisticated financial products and 
complex investment banking strategies pursued by SIFIs. Critical technolo-
gy-based solutions typically take years to install and perfect—a predictable 
and steady source of funding could enable the Council to more easily de-
velop and deploy such solutions.359 
Additionally, stable resources could offer the TBTF subsidies’ exami-
nation program increased flexibility to respond to developing and emerging 
risks related to the TBTF banks, the stability of the financial markets, and 
to direct staffing and strategic responses that may help address critical is-
sues.360  Particularly, the examination program would be better situated to 
assign necessary resources and staff to address identified risks because the 
program would foster its own experts who know best how to mitigate the 
 
 358 For guidance on how the user-fees could be used see SEC Staff Study, supra note 354; SEC 
Staff, Enhancing Investment Adviser Examinations, 2011 WL 216287 (C.C.H.), Jan. 20, 2011. 
 359 Id. 
 360 Id. 




risks of TBTF banks.361 
Moreover, retaining exclusive responsibility of the Council to conduct 
SIFIs’ subsidies examinations (funded by user-fees) may avoid certain 
problematic issues associated with delegating examination responsibilities 
or coordinating supervisions between various bodies, which might include 
not only direct costs required for the monitoring, but also other costs that 
are even more difficult to quantify.  Indeed, for example, in 2012 JPMorgan 
lost billions of dollars as a result of excessive risk-taking, even as regulators 
struggled to implement the Dodd-Frank Act’s Volcker rule that tries to pre-
vent banks from speculating in such financial derivatives.362  JPMorgan’s 
trades got around the rule by labeling the risky bets as “hedges,” and the 
loss took place despite the scrutiny of 110 regulators domiciled inside 
JPMorgan from several federal agencies.363 
 C. Calculating the User-Fees 
Similarly to the Subsidy Reserve Fund proposal, when adopting a us-
er-fee model, a potential critical difficulty could be to how to determine 
what subsidies the TBTF banks receive and thus what the subsidy-related 
fees should be.  Nevertheless, for the purpose of setting user-fees, I suggest 
adopting a somewhat efficient and straightforward method that helps avoid 
dealing with a controversial subsidies calculation.  No levels of subsidies 
will be calculated, and instead banks would pay fees calculated in the same 
way that real estate taxes are currently being assessed by local govern-
ments,364 based on the assessed value of each bank and a mill-rate-assessed-
value.365  Thus, based on a percentage of their value, banks valued at more 
 
 361 Id. 
 362 See Packin, supra note 318. 
 363 Id. 
 364 Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the “Get What You Pay For” Model of Local Government, 
56 FLA. L. REV. 373, 380 (2004) (“At the local level, the predominant form of taxation is the property 
tax, which is levied as a percentage rate against the assessed value of each parcel of land (and its im-
provements) located within the taxing unit’s territorial jurisdiction.”) 
 365 There are several methods to estimate banks’ value.  For example, the OCC typically uses three 
methods to calculate the value of banks’ shares when under 12 U.S.C. §§ 214(a) and 215(a), sharehold-
ers dissenting to a conversion, consolidation, or merger involving a national bank request the bank’s 
shares valuation.  SEE ADMIN. OF NAT’L BANKS, U.S. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE 
CURRENCY, BANKING BULLETIN 88-22, OCC VALUATION METHODS – 1985-1986 (1988) [hereinafter 
BANKING REP.].  First, the market value of shares being appraised, which can be based on direct quotes 
from a market-maker, if sufficient trading in the shares exists and the prices are available. And courts 
have held that states’ taxing statues provide that “value” in the context of bank shares should mean rea-
sonable cash market value. Id.; American Bank & Trust Co. v. Dallas County, 679 S.W.2d 566, 570 
(Tex. App. 1984).  Second, the investment value method, which “requires an assessment of the value to 
investors of a share in the future earnings of the target bank . . . estimated by applying an average 
price/earnings ratio of banks with similar earnings potential to the earnings capacity of the target bank.” 
See BANKING REP.  Third, the adjusted book value method, which is calculated by multiplying the book 
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than a pre-determined TBTF-qualifying minimum value would pay user-
fees.  The higher the bank valuation is the higher the user-fees it would be 
presumed to need to pay. 
 D. TBTF User-Fees: Concerns and Advantages 
The central problem with the user-fee system, aside from doubts about 
its actual effectiveness, arises from the fact that it consists of having indus-
try provide the operating funds the federal regulator needs to do its day-to-
day work, with strings attached.  This problem has one main principal as-
pect, which is that for SIFIs that paid their user-fees, paying such fees 
might create an implicit obligation on the part of regulators to bail-out the 
paying SIFIs in the event of distress.  In other words, the payment or non-
payment of user-fees can create expectations on the part of regulators.366  In 
order to prevent the creation of such expectations, the regulators should 
make it clear that complying with the user-fee regulation is mandatory and 
does not merit any additional financial assistance from the government un-
der any circumstances.  Paying user-fees should be viewed similarly to pay-
ing taxes—a legal duty that if ignored might result in severe legal conse-
quences.  While in theory such a concern is legitimate, assessing it in a real-
world perspective appears to make it seem meaningless.  Indeed, following 
the financial crisis the government and regulators have been repeatedly 
promising “no more bailouts.”  Even President Obama, in multiple speech-
es, has accepted the argument that the most important goal for financial re-
form is to prevent future bailouts.367  But despite this very clear message, 
the existence of the TBTF subsidies is the best indicator of the fact that in-
vestors and big financial institutions, as well as the general public do not 
believe this government’s promise to be the case.  Hence, whether or not 
paying user-fees would create additional expectations among large financial 
institutions about getting bailed out is irrelevant, as such expectations are 
already in existence, despite the administration’s efforts to prove different-
ly.368 
In addition, there are several distinct advantages in adopting such a 
simple method.  First and foremost, this proposal could be used together 
 
value—assets’ historical acquisition costs—of the “target bank’s assets per share times the average mar-
ket price to book value ratio of comparable banking organizations.” Id. 
 366 Such a problem has also been raised in the context of the FDA.  See O’Leary, supra note 354. 
 367 Floyd Norris, No More Bailouts?, N.Y. TIMES (April. 22, 2010, 12:24 PM), available at 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/22/no-more-bailouts/; Ryan Tracy, Dodd and Frank: No 
Government Bailouts Allowed, WALL. ST. J. (Mar. 31, 2014 5:48 PM), available at 
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/03/31/dodd-and-frank-no-government-bailouts-allowed/ (“We 
did, I believe, the maximum that you could do legally to make clear that if a large financial institution 
incurs debts it cannot pay, it is out of business and no taxpayer money can be used.”). 
 368 See Tracy, supra note 367 (“If ‘too big to fail’ is defined as ending public bailouts of large finan-
cial institutions, the law says that,” Mr. Pawlenty said. The markets can “choose to believe it or not.”). 




with other approaches and proposals.  For example, if a user-fee system 
were in place, capital requirements presumably would not need to be quite 
as high as they should be without a user-fee system.  Second, a similar sys-
tem already exists for taxing purposes, and business entities already know 
how to work the various functions of that system.  Third, such a system has 
a self-policing element to it, which enables the big banks’ executives and 
managements to figure out what they want their assets and values to be, 
given this new tax in the mix of competing issues, such as executives’ 
pay.369  Fourth, big banks that have foreign subsidiaries would be required 
to pay user-fees that would be calculated on their asset value of the foreign 
subsidiary.  Doing so would make it very difficult for big banks to hide 
profits off-shore, as it is not their profits that are not being assessed for the 
mandatory user-fees, but the assets’ values.  Fifth, similarly to the FDA’s 
guidelines, the supervising agency should permit waiver of or reduction in 
one or more user-fees assessed where it finds that a big financial institution 
meets the eligibility criteria.370  Indeed, the purpose of the user-fees is to 
sponsor a government agency’s work supervising SIFIs and better monitor 
how it manages risk, while also shifting some of the regulation-compliance 
burden to the SIFIs, incentivizing them to internally reduce some of the 
TBTF perverse effects.  And the tax, user-fees that each SIFI would need to 
pay, would be based on the assumption that if a SIFI is valued at more than 
a certain threshold amount, which would be set at $100 billion,371 it is prob-
ably viewed by the public as a TBTF bank and, has a significant market 
share in, and impact on, the financial global markets.  This is because TBTF 
subsidies negatively impact the entire society, but the biggest financial in-
stitutions are not taking responsibility for their involvement with this phe-
nomenon, although they should. 
 
 369 Equity-based awards, coupled with the capital structure of banks, tie executives’ compensation to 
a highly levered bet on the value of banks’ assets and impact the executives’ incentives.  See generally 
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Banker’s Pay, 98 GEO. L. J. 247 (2010). 
 370 “According to section 736(d) of the Act, FDA will grant a waiver of or reduction in one or more 
user fees assessed under section 736(a) of the Act where it finds that an applicant meets the eligibility 
criteria . . . .” U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,ET AL, OMB CONTROL NO. 0910-0693, 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: USER FEE WAIVERS, REDUCTIONS, AND REFUNDS FOR DRUG AND 
BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS 4 (2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/ 
GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm079298.pdf. 
 371 I believe that $100 billion should be the minimum threshold above which a bank would have to 
comply with the user-fees regulation.  This number is not random.  It is based on the Federal Reserve 
and Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. determination that banks with at least $50 billion in total consoli-
dated assets but less than $100 billion in nonbank assets are unlikely to shake the financial system in a 
collapse, and hence can follow a template to write tailored Dodd-Frank Act required resolution plans 
and living wills.  Thus, banks that are worth less than that would be exempt from the user-fees, as it ap-
pears that the regulators view their share in, and impact on, the markets as less dramatic.  See Jesse 
Hamilton, U.S. Banking Agencies Issue Template for Bank ‘Living Wills’, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 3, 2013, 
2:48 PM), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-03/u-s-banking-agencies-issue-
template-for-bank-living-wills-1-.html. 
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The TBTF subsidies essentially impact taxpayers, which end-up pay-
ing the biggest SIFIs’ subsidies cost.  Based on basic torts law theory, 
plaintiffs have traditional remedies available against identifiable tortfeasors.  
However, when plaintiffs have no other remedy, numerous courts have ap-
plied market-share theories, which depart from the common law require-
ments of causation and product identification.372  They held that market-
share permits a defendant to be held liable based on its share of the relevant 
business market, without proof that the defendant’s business caused the al-
leged damage.373  In the TBTF- banks context, the tortfeasors are the big-
gest banks that hurt the economy and the taxpayers, and so if their value is 
higher than the minimum set amount, they will be presumed to be danger-
ous TBTF institutions and will be required to pay user-fees.  Nevertheless, 
similarly to the market-share theory in torts, a defendant may exculpate it-
self from liability by establishing through, by a preponderance of evidence, 
that it is not a TBTF bank, and hence not partly responsible for the TBTF 
subsidies’ problem.  And if a SIFI were able to do so, showing that it does 
not enjoy any TBTF subsidies’ benefits, and does not burden taxpayers and 
society, such a SIFI would be exempt from paying the user-fees.374  There-
fore, a great advantage of the user-fee model is that if a SIFI is required to 
pay user-fees, but is able to prove based on pre-determined criteria that it 
does not benefit from TBTF subsidies despite the assumption based on its 
value level, on which the user-fee is based, that SIFI would be exempt from 
paying.  Thus, the user-fee proposal might makes sense even if there turns 
out not to be a TBTF subsidy despite such prior assumptions.  In that case, 
presumably, there would simply be no fee to pay. 
 VI. CONCLUSION 
Despite the Dodd-Frank Act’s efforts to end the TBTF problem in 
2010, several years after the act’s passage the problem remains unsolved375 
and no satisfactory plans to safely wind-down TBTF banks exist.376  Thus, 
many argue that the largest banks need to be reorganized in order to lessen 
 
 372 See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, at 936–37, (Cal. 1980); Conley v. Boyle 
Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275, 286 (Fla. 1990) (developing market share theory, which allows damaged 
plaintiffs that cannot determine which particular defendant caused their damage, to sue defendants col-
lectively using a market-share analysis.). 
 373 Id. 
 374 Conley, 570 So. 2d at 282.  Especially, as SIFIs’ failures are not borne just by the risk-taking 
SIFIs, but impact many others. 
 375 According to Senator Elizabeth Warren, “the bigger these banks get the harder it is for the U.S. 
government to declare with any credibility that they will not bail them out if they get into trouble.” Evan 
Weinberger, GAO Says Wall Street Had No Undue Influence On Bank Study, LAW360 (Jan. 08, 2014), 
available at http://www.law360.com/securities/articles/499394/gao-says-wall-street-had-no-undue-
influence-on-bank-study. 
 376 See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 316. 




the amount of risk that they pose to the financial system.377 Indeed, many 
commentators doubt that the biggest banks will ever be able to come up 
with satisfactory resolution plans, as it is not clear if living wills can actual-
ly help prevent financial crises.378  Alternatively, experts advocate for 
changing the bankruptcy code to make it easier to resolve large institu-
tions,379 although reforms are not likely to happen in the near future.380 
Following the unflattering media spotlight and reports on TBTF 
banks’ subsidies, several banks have commissioned their own studies, argu-
ing that they do not receive any subsidies.381 Nevertheless, after reviewing 
the relevant available literature, FDIC Vice Chairman, Thomas Hoenig tes-
tified before the House Financial Services Committee that while “the esti-
mated size of the subsidy may vary in degree, depending on the methodolo-
gy, nearly all independent studies calculate the value to be in the billions of 
dollars.”382 
My focus in this article has been on showing that there is a TBTF sub-
sidy, explaining the perverse effects that result from the subsidy, and exam-
ining the solutions that have been suggested to deal with these effects.  I al-
so suggest a new user-fee model that could be used with other approaches, 
and that makes sense even if there was no TBTF subsidy, because the fee 
would vanish if the subsidy is later found to be illusory.  The conclusion I 
derive from my analysis is that the TBTF problem is not just an academic 
puzzle to be solved, but a complex, continuing political-economic situation.  
And while some of the best economic minds in the world are trying to fig-
ure out how to deal with this, unfortunately, there is no quick fix, nor a con-
sensus on how to best tackle this problem.  A main aspect of the difficulty 
 
 377 Jesse Hamilton & Craig Torres, Biggest Banks’ Wind-Down Plans Seen Failing to Cut Risks, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, (June 26, 2013, 12:01 AM), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-
26/biggest-banks-wind-down-plans-seen-failing-to-cut-risks.html (“It is by now well known that the 
2010 Dodd-Frank financial reforms did little to diminish the too-big-to-fail status of America’s largest 
banks.”). 
 378 Id. 
 379 This includes a Hoover Institution proposal for a new Chapter 14, which consists of a handful of 
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code that would make it more effective as a mechanism for handling the 
default of a large financial institution. See Bankruptcy Not Bailout: A Special Chapter 14 (Kenneth E. 
Scott & John B. Taylor, eds., 2012).  It also includes the Bipartisan Policy Center that suggested the 
bankruptcy code must change to give banks more flexibility to detach themselves from financial entan-
glements.  See John Bovenzi et al., Too Big to Fail: The Path to a Solution, the Bipartisan Policy Cen-
ter, BIPARTISANPOLICY.ORG (May 14, 2013), available at http://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/report/too-
big-fail-path-solution. 
 380 Simon Johnson, The Bankruptcy Exemption, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2013, 12:01 AM), available at 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/07/the-bankruptcy-exemption/?_r=1. 
 381 See, e.g., STOGIN, supra note 13; Policy Brief, supra note 13. 
 382 See Examining How the Dodd-Frank Act Could Result in More Taxpayer-Funded Bailouts: 
Hearing Before H. Comm. On Fin. Servs., 113th Cong. 9 (2013) (statement of Thomas M. Hoening, 
Vice Chairman, FDIC), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg81769/pdf/CHRG-
113hhrg81769.pdf. 
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results from the fact that it is very difficult to calculate the total amount of 
the implicit and explicit TBTF subsidies and understand their perverse ef-
fects. Those interested in finding and challenging different subsidies are at 
an informational disadvantage, which is multiplied given the convoluted-
ness of the subsidies themselves.  As described in this article, data is widely 
fragmented and many of the value transfer means are not easy to quantify, 
especially in the tax subsidy area. This secrecy makes criticism by outside 
experts nearly impossible. 
A different aspect of the TBTF problem is that following the crisis 
some of the leading U.S. banks have become even bigger and more com-
plex.  And while evidence implies that financial institutions can grow too-
big-to-manage, as it is doubtful that true efficiency is attained by banks be-
ing valued at more than $100 billion,383 there is disagreement on whether 
providing massive subsidies to such banks is helpful in preventing systemic 
risk. The living wills solution is not likely to be effective either, for various 
reasons,384 and will not prevent future bailouts, or modify the fashion in 
which regulators will deal with future crises.385  Indeed, following the first 
few rounds of submissions of the largest banks’ living wills, commentators 
and regulators have admitted that the plans are falling far short of what is 
required.386  These failures result in increasing calls for breaking-up the 
biggest banks to reduce the risk of future crises, and as the most effective 
way to deal with the problem,387 especially following some of the recent big 
banks’ scandals.388  Since break-ups are problematic and unrealistic,389 I be-
lieve that the practical user-fee model in combination with one or more ap-
proaches, can better address the problem.  And while adopting the user-fee 
approach will only have a limited effect on the existence of the implicit 
 
 383 See Anat Admati, Featured Guest, Debate:Big Banks: Should Big Banks be Broken Up?, 
ECONOMIST.COM, May 14, 2013), available at http://www.economist.com/debate/days/view/977; Alan 
Greenspan, The Crisis 231 (Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/ES/BPEA/2010_spring_bpea_papers/2010a_bpea_gr
eenspan.pdf (“Federal Reserve research had been unable to find economies of scale in banking beyond a 
modest-sized institution.”). 
 384 See generally Packin, supra note 10. 
 385 See David Skeel, Magical Thinking at the FDIC, LESS THAN THE LEAST (Apr. 20, 2011, 
11:08AM), http://www.law.upenn.edu/blogs/dskeel/. 
 386 Alan Pyke, Megabanks Are Unable To Prove They Aren’t Too Big To Fail, THINK PROGRESS, 
(June 26, 2013, 1:15 PM), available at http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2013/06/26/2219551/ 
megabanks-are-unable-to-prove-they-arent-too-big-to-fail/?mobile=nc. 
 387 See supra note 316. 
 388  See e.g., Jesse Colombo, This New Libor ‘Scandal’ Will Cause A Terrifying Financial Crisis, 
FORBES (June 3, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jessecolombo/2014/06/03/this-new-libor-scandal-
will-cause-a-terrifying-financial-crisis/. 
 389 Paul Krugman, Too Big to Fail FAIL, N.Y. TIMES, (June 8, 2009, 9:10 PM), available at 
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/18/too-big-to-fail-fail/ (“I think of the pursuit of a world in 
which everyone is small enough to fail as the pursuit of a golden age that never was. Regulate and su-
pervise, then rescue if necessary; there’s no way to make this automatic.”). 




TBTF subsidies and not solve the TBTF issue, its main forte lies in its abil-
ity to reduce the probability of distress, enhancing regulatory supervision of 
SIFIs, as well as transparency, and contributing, even if partially, to a reso-
lution fund. 
